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ARTICLES
BRIGHT LINE FEVER AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENTt*
Albert W. Alschuler**
I.

INTRODUCTION

A critical issue which appears and reappears in virtually every
phase of government is how much to sacrifice justice in an individual case for the sake of administering justice by rules. Rules tend to
limit the importance of subjective judgment, to promote equality, to
control corruption, to simplify administration and to provide a basis
for planning before and after controversies arise. Nevertheless, the
limitations of language and the variety and unpredictability of
human behavior make extremely difficult the articulation of general
principles that will yield justice in almost every situation that they
address. When the best rules that our powers can devise produce
injustice often enough, we do well to abandon them even at the
price of lawlessness. The appropriate blend of law and discretion
cannot be determined "in the large"; the issue must be resolved "in
the specific" by examining the merits and demerits of particular
rules.
In these generalities, I have belabored a point that Plato made
more eloquently 2500 years ago.' Nevertheless, the powers of the
police sometimes inspire pronouncements that disregard these simple truths. For more than a decade, writing about law enforcement
has been dominated by .general denunciations of police discretion
and general calls for governance by rules. Some of our nation's best
3
scholars and judges-with Kenneth Culp Davis, 2 Carl McGowan,
t
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1. PLATO, The Statesman, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 283, 322-25 (Jowett trans. 1937).

2. K.

DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY

(1969).
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Anthony G. Amsterdam, 4 John Kaplan 5 and James Vorenberg 6
among them-have proclaimed the need for rules and guidelines to
channel police discretion. These writers often have suggested that
the police should draft the necessary guidelines themselves. Some
of them have argued that courts should interpret the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to require the police
to create internal regulations. Some have proposed that the police
view the rulemaking procedures of federal administrative agencies
as their guideline for writing guidelines.
Almost all of us accept the basic principle that these writers
have expressed. Apart from some members of the Conference on
Critical Legal Studies, hardly anyone regards the ideal of the rule of
law as controversial. When rules can limit the play of atomistic,
idiosyncratic choice without yielding significant injustice, of course
they should be adopted. But what should the rules be? Might the
complexities that have inhibited current lawmakers from confining
police discretion inhibit new lawmakers as well? If guidelines were
specific enough to serve their purposes, might they fail to anticipate
important public needs in a significant number of situations? Or,
more probably, might the guidelines consist of pabulum-like generalities which fail to offer real guidance?7 These issues-the critical
issues-have been repeatedly neglected. For the most part, the
scholars and judges have left the detail work to others. Their point
has not been that they could propose workable guidelines themselves; it has been that police departments could do so once they
adopted the suggested procedures. The role of the judges and schol8
ars has been merely to advocate more law.
3.
4.
5.
6.
(1976).
TION

McGowan, Rulemaking and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 414-29 (1974).
Kaplan, The Limits of the ExclusionaryRule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1050-55 (1974).
Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of CriminalJustice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651

7. See, e.g.,
(1980).

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECU-

8. Of course, the proponents of law enforcement guidelines have recognized in the abstract a
need to blend law and discretion. Some, in fact, have offered sensitive discussions of the issue.
None has gone very far, however, towards demonstrating the feasibility of a regime of detailed
guidelines. In the end, for example, Professor Davis observed:
The principal reason for inadequacy of administrative rules is inability of administrators
to see all around a subject sufficiently to risk generalizations in rules. . . . The way out
of this common impasse is for administrators to recognize that rules need not be in the
form of generalizations. When an administrator knows the answer to a hypothetical
case, he should issue a rule, stating the case, his position, and his reasons, without a
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There is only one way to determine whether the closer control
of police discretion through rulemaking is feasible; and if the advocates of guidelines tried their hands at drafting- useful guidelines,
they might find recent judicial experience instructive. In adjudication under the fourth amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has expressed concern about the lack of legal guidance afforded police officers. Moreover, the Court has articulated a series of "bright
line rules" to begin to remedy this defect. In each of the four cases
that this article will consider, the Court has indicated that prophylactic rules-rules that the Court has recognized are likely to yield
injustice in particular situations-should be substituted for the generalities of the fourth amendment.
In Dunaway v. New York, 9 the Supreme Court declared, "A single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have
only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social
and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they
confront."10 In Robinson v. United States,I l the Court said: "[O]ur
• . .fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises
from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue
of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting
the authority for a search ... "12 In Michigan v. Summers, 13 the
Court observed that its ruling would not require an officer "to evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying the detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure."' 4 This
generalization. When further hypothetical cases can be added, they should be. As this
kind of rule-making interacts with decisions in particular cases, generalizations will usually emerge in due course.
K. DAvIs, supra note 2, at 220 (emphasis and footnote omitted).
It is difficult to imagine that a police administrator would (or should) promulgate a "rule"
limited to situations in which a husband appears to have assaulted his wife by throwing a vase at
her, in which the husband has one prior arrest for assault but no convictions, in which the immediate provocation for the husband's action appears to have been the wife's shouted statement that
he should get a job, in which the wife's only apparent injury is a slightly bruised forehead, in
which the husband appears highly intoxicated but expresses remorse for his conduct, in which the
wife wishes to have the husband removed from the premises but does not wish to have him prosecuted, and in which the wife claims that the vase thrown by the husband had special sentimental
value. Each of the circumstances of this case would seem to have some bearing on whether to
arrest the husband, and the case is not one of unusual complexity.
9. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
10. Id at 213-14.
11. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
12. Id at 235.
13. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
14. Id at 705 n.19.
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unequivocality was essential, the Court said, for "if police are to
have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests...
'must in large part be done on a categorical basis-not in an ad hoc,
case-by-case fashion by individual police officers.' "15 Similarly, in
New York v. Belton, 16 the Court said that "in order to establish the
workable rule this category of cases requires," it would endorse a
proposition that it regarded as "generally even if not inevitably"
17
appropriate.
The scholar whose writings are most clearly associated with the
Supreme Court's recent emphasis on bright line rules is Professor
Wayne R. LaFave, America's foremost authority on the fourth
amendment. In his 1982 Mellon Lectures at the University of Pittsburgh,'8 Professor LaFave objected to the bright line rule that the
Supreme Court had articulated in Belton, and described in greater
detail the circumstances in which he considered prophylactic fourth
amendment rules appropriate. At the same time, he reiterated the
need for these prophylactic rules in a variety of situations. Professor
LaFave's central argument for unyielding fourth amendment rules
appears in a passage which the Supreme Court quoted with approval in Belton:
Fourth Amendment doctrine ...is primarily intended to regulate the

police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be expressed in
terms that are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged. A highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts and
requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions, may
be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and
judges eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of application
by the officer in the field."
[The security that the fourth amendment was designed to protect]
can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which,
in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.' 9
15. Id (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219-20 (White, J., concurring)).
16. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
17. Id at 460.
18. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World- On Drawing "Bright Lines" and
"Good Faith," 43 U. PITT. L. REv. 307 (1982).
19. LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication" Versus "StandardizedProcedures' The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141-42 (quoted in Belton, 453 U.S. at 458). As Professor
LaFave has recognized, the argument that he has advanced for unyielding fourth amendment
rules also has been made by other distinguished scholars. See, e.g., E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND
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The thesis of this article is that a bright line approach to interpretation of the fourth amendment is "generally even if not inevitably" misconceived. As I have indicated, I have no quarrel with the
principle that doing justice in an individual case may be less important than providing a clear and workable rule. Nevertheless, I believe that the search for bright line fourth amendment rules typically
leads to a disregard of values more substantial than those depicted
in the writings of LaFave-"hair-splitting distinctions," "subtle nuances," "finespun new doctrines," "recondite matters," and "the
heady stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed." 20 Not only do categorical fourth amendment rules
often lead to substantial injustice; in addition, their artificiality commonly makes them difficult, not easy, to apply.
Bright line fourth amendment rules may fail in their mission of
simplifying the administration of justice for essentially three reasons. First, the effort to draft even a partial code of fourth amendment law may yield an unmanageable multiplicity of rules-more
bright lines than the human eye can keep in view. Second, the task
of marking the boundary of even a bright line rule usually is not
mechanical; and when the rule is artificial, delimiting its boundary
becomes a matter of guesswork. Third, the articulation of bright
line rules to govern some situations inevitably raises the question
whether other bright line rules will be developed for other situations. Artificiality begets artificiality, and especially when categorical rules are developed by courts rather than legislatures, it becomes
difficult to tell where the process will end.
Ultimately, for all of these reasons, categorical rules may
muddy more than they clarify. Rather than choose between the
competing evils of injustice in individual cases and imprecision in
governing principles, courts may give us both.
II.

PROPHYLAXIS IN PERSPECTIVE

I said at the outset that the virtues and vices of prophylactic
rules must be examined "in the specific." Nevertheless, before turning to the "specific" bright line principles that the Supreme Court's
SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT 47, 48 (1975); Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 375;

Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the FourthAmendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND.
LJ.329, 365 (1973).
20. These phrases appear in LaFave, supra note 19, at 141, 143, 162.
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fourth amendment decisions have articulated, I think it worthwhile
to set the stage by offering four general observations.
A.

The Fourth Amendment as an Ex Post Demandfor Perfection
or as an Ex Ante Rule of Reason?

The proponents of bright line rules commonly claim that without them police officers would be subjected topost hoc demands for
perfection. As they describe today's judicial administration of the
fourth amendment, appellate judges with the advantage of years of
legal training and experience, the use of extensive law libraries, the
benefit of collegial deliberation, and the assistance of capable law
clerks, review at their leisure the propriety of a police officer's actions. The judges commonly divide upon the issue-sometimes by a
vote of five to four. Then the judges write opinions analyzing a
multiplicity of factual and legal concerns at length and in detail.
The officer whose actions prompted this activity may have had only
a moment to analyze the factual and legal issues presented in a tense
and fast-breaking situation. Nevertheless, his actions may be held
unconstitutional simply because he took a position ultimately
adopted by four judges rather than five.
We have known since the days of The Mikado that a police
officer's lot is not a happy one, but it is desirable to place the issue in
perspective. Just as the fourth amendment proscribes unreasonable
searches and seizures in general terms, the law of torts subjects all of
us to a demand of reasonableness in everything we do. When a
person departs from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe and when injury results from this departure, the law
is likely to subject the negligent actor to consequences more unpleasant in personal terms than the exclusion of the fruit of his labor
from evidence in a criminal case. Tort law provides no exemption
for split-second decisions (not even for decisions made at fifty-five
miles per hour), and it applies when a violation of duty is so unclear
that opposing parties take the issue to litigation with the expectation
of almost-certain victory apparent on both sides.
Of course, the amorphous character of the law of negligence is
not one of its virtues, and from time to time courts have attempted
to render this body of law more precise by specifying in detail certain duties or rules of conduct. The history of the effort has not
been encouraging. The classic illustration is the "stop and look"
rule for railroad crossings that the Supreme Court articulated in an
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opinion by Justice Holmes in 1927 21-and that the Court abandoned in an opinion by Justice Cardozo in 1934.22 The failure of
judicial attempts to articulate bright line rules for the resolution of
tort disputes may point a lesson for fourth amendment litigation as
well.
Despite its imprecision, most of us do not complain that the law
of negligence subjects us to impossible demands and the fourth
amendment's rule of reason no more demands the impossible of law
enforcement officers than tort law demands the unattainable of the
rest of us. Both bodies of law, at least when properly administered,
take account of the circumstances in which a challenged decision
was made. If, in light of both general standards of decency and the
available legal guidance, a police officer did as well as could be expected in making a necessarily hasty decision to search or arrest, the
search or arrest cannot fairly be condemned as unreasonable.
Of course, courts may divide sharply on the weight to be given
various circumstances including an officer's need for immediate action. A court's close division certainly does not establish that any
member of the court ignored the difficulty of the officer's situation
or that any member viewed the officer's conduct only from apost
hoc perspective. Similarly, judges may recognize the need for
speedy, unreflective action in the field although their own opinions
adhere to an established judicial tradition and offer more than instinctive, one-sentence responses to the totality of the circumstances.
A detailed opinion may be designed merely to demonstrate to others
the unreasonableness of a particular intuitive response. It is odd to
argue, as Justice White did in a dissenting opinion in Stone v. Powell, 23 that the fourth amendment commonly forbids searches and
seizures when an "officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and
should act in similar circumstances." 24 When an officer acts reasonably, it would torture the English language to condemn his action as
an unreasonable search. 25
21. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
22. Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). The conventional wisdom imparted to
first-year law students is that Justice Cardozo clearly won this debate on the scope of the rule of
law in tort ligitation.
23. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
24. Id at 539-40 (White, J., dissenting).
25. This statement requires some qualification in situations in which, although the officer
acts reasonably, he relies on a determination by some other authority that has not acted reasonably-for example, a superior officer, a police legal advisor, a magistrate, a legislature or even the
United States Supreme Court. Thus, a police officer may act reasonably when he relies on a

HeinOnline -- 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 233 1983-1984

234

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:227

To be sure, courts occasionally have seemed to demand the
same complex, multifaceted analyses on the part of officers in the
field that they have offered in their own opinions. 26 Although they
uniformly have recognized that factual circumstances must be judged ex ante,27 some courts may not have applied an ex ante perspective to issues of law. They may have asked what an ideal response
to the factual circumstances would have been, not simply whether
an officer acted reasonably. 28 Judicial decisions that fit this pattern
may justly be criticized. Nevertheless, the unhappy lot of law enforcement officers does not require the articulation of bright line
rules. On the contrary, to require that officers master and apply a
multiplicity of artificial rules may demand more than they should be
expected to provide. A rule of reason that takes an officer's unhappy lot as its starting point may be fairer, not only from the perpublic justice, but also from
spective of the sound administration of
29
the perspective of the officer himself.
magistrate's determination of probable cause, but if the magistrate acted unreasonably in finding
probable cause, the officer's search remains unreasonable. Similarly, a police officer who, in the
period just prior to Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), thoroughly searched a room or
house in which a suspect had been arrested, probably would have acted reasonably under the
applicable Supreme Court precedents; but if the Court had acted unreasonably in authorizing this
sort of wide-ranging search incident to arrest, the search would violate the fourth amendment. In
short, although in most situations the fourth amendment establishes only a rule of reason, this rule
of reason ought to extend to all governmental agencies and officers. But see Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
26. Professor LaFave has cited Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and
United States v. Lindsay, 506 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1974), as illustrations. LaFave, supra note 18, at
321-22.
27. See, e.g., infra notes 48-102 and accompanying text (discussing the traditional judicial
definition of "probable cause"); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
28. One reason for this failure to apply an ex ante perspective consistently may be the courts'
sense that they are not judging the past so much as establishing rules for the future. They may
ask, not whether the officer whose conduct is at issue acted reasonably, but how another officer
should act tomorrow if the same circumstances were to be duplicated. The judicial development
of fourth amendment law merges two tasks that sometimes might profitably be separated, judging
the past and guiding the future. In that respect, this body of law differs from tort law; a jury's
finding of negligence guides future conduct in only a vague, assimilative sense. Nevertheless,
antediluvian though it probably seems to say so, the principal function of courts, even in fourth
amendment cases, is to judge the past. Basically, judges should guide the future only insofar as
guidance emerges from their efforts to do justice in the cases before them. When other means of
guiding the future become necessary (and of course they often do), it is ordinarily the province of
other governmental bodies to supply them.
29. The sense that fourth amendment doctrine currently subjects police officers to post hoc
demands for perfection has prompted, not only the development of bright line rules, but also
proposals to limit the exclusion of evidence under the fourth amendment to situations in which a
police officer has acted without a "reasonable good faith belief' in the lawfulness of his conduct.
Once it is recognized that in most situations the fourth amendment establishes only a rule of
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ProphylacticRules or Presumptive Rules?
Prophylactic rules should be distinguished from rules that are

reason to be applied from an ex ante perspective, the arguments for creating a "reasonable good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule ring hollow.
As Professor Phillip E. Johnson has observed, the principle that has led some observers to
favor a "reasonable good faith" exception is sound: the reasonableness of a police officer's actions
should be judged, not on the basis of hindsight, but on the basis of the circumstances that confronted the officer and the knowledge that he could fairly have been expected to possess. As
Professor Johnson also has noted, however, the adoption of a "reasonable good faith" exception is
unnecessary to implement this principle. Under a proper interpretation, the fourth amendment
itself reflects the ex ante perspective that the proponents of a "reasonable good faith" exception
consider appropriate. Address by Phillip E. Johnson to the Workshop on Teaching Criminal
Justice of the Association of American Law Schools, in Chicago (Oct. 15, 1983).
Professor Johnson's analysis does not imply that the adoption of a "reasonable good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule would be inconsequential, yielding only the same outcomes that
an appropriate reading of the fourth amendment itself would produce. To the contrary, the overlay of one "reasonableness" standard upon another would be likely to yield mind-boggling confusion.
Were a "reasonable good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule established, courts undoubtedly would be reluctant to find subjective bad faith on the part of police officers (both because this bad faith usually would not exist and because doubtful cases probably would be
resolved in favor of the officers). To a large extent, "good faith" therefore would drop from the
test; the critical issue would be posed by the modifier "reasonable." Reasonableness, however,
always has been the central fourth amendment inquiry--the amendment proscribes only "unrea-

sonable" searches and seizures. In many cases, a "reasonable good faith" exception would seem
to ask whether an officer reasonably believed in the reasonableness of his action. This strange

query would seem to invite slippage. "Reasonable good faith" apparently would become a way of
saying: "The officer acted improperly, but it's close enough for government work."

Moreover, a "reasonable good faith" exception would seem to focus attention on the judgments and actions of the police officers who conduct searches and seizures rather than on the
judgments of other officials who authorize these searches and seizures. See supra note 25. The
effect sometimes might be to leave departures from current fourth amendment requirements without redress while blocking the development of more sensible requirements. For example, in light
of the confused state of the law governing the warrantless searches of automobiles and of containers within them (see infra notes 174-202 and accompanying text), it would be difficult ever to
conclude that an officer who had conducted a warrantless search of a container inside an automobile on the basis of probable cause had done so without "reasonable good faith." Moreover, the
"reasonable good faith" of the officer would resolve the only outcome-controlling issue in the case,
saving the courts from any need to reassess the "reasonableness" of their past rulings.
In fact, the creation of a "reasonable good faith" exception probably would reflect a desire to
escape the unfortunate complexity of the Supreme Court's fourth amendment decisions. Whenever "the law" becomes complex, the impulse is strong to establish principles of "equity" and start
over. After encumbering the fourth amendment's basic rule of reason with an accretion of complex subordinate rules, the Court therefore may seek to establish a fresh test of reasonableness by
creating an exception to the principal mechanism for implementing existing law. The difficulty is
that a "reasonable good faith" exception would truly not offer a fresh start. Instead, it would
enshrine past rulings as its baseline for judging both "reasonableness" and "good faith."
The past application of a "reasonable good faith" standard might well have altered the outcome of every criminal case in which the Supreme Court has found a fourth amendment violation
since its decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Cases typically reach the Court because
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thought to provide a just resolution of every case within their terms
and that courts are prepared to modify when, in unanticipated circumstances, they work unjustly. Judges sometimes can give police
officers substantial guidance through the development of this second, less-bedazzling sort of rule. Consider, for example, the situation in which a citizen complains to an officer that he has been
assaulted by a person whom he knows and whom he identifies. The
citizen may be i stranger to the officer, and the officer may know
nothing about his credibility. Does this citizen's statement-without
more-give the officer probable cause to arrest the accused
wrongdoer?
This issue recurs frequently, and it is appropriate for courts to
resolve it in general terms. Many courts have. One court has said,
for example,
A "citizen-informant" is a citizen who purports to be the victim of or to
have been the witness to a crime who is motivated by good citizenship
they present doubtful issues, and a "reasonable good faith" standard suggests that the very doubtfulness of the issues should preclude exclusion of the evidence seized.
For example, the federal agents whose conduct was at issue in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), certainly acted in "reasonable good faith" when they attached electronic surveillance
equipment to the outside of a telephone booth that they expected the defendant to use. Similarly,
the officers whose conduct was at issue in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), acted in
"reasonable good faith" when, as an incident of a lawful arrest, they searched the entire house of
the person whom they had arrested. Moreover, in light of prior judicial rulings, the officers whose
conduct was at issue in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), acted in "reasonable good faith"
when they entered a private residence without a warrant to effect a felony arrest.
Rather than invite the semantic confusion of a "reasonable good faith" standard, courts
ought to emphasize that the fourth amendment mandates evaluation of an officer's actions only
from an ex ante perspective. At the same time, courts should recognize that the reasonableness of
the officer's conduct is not always the determinative issue; sometimes, for example, the reasonableness of the courts' own past decisions may be critical. See supra note 25.
Some commentators have suggested that the exclusionary rule should be applicable only to
the unreasonable actions of police officers because it has not been demonstrated that the misconduct of other officials "is a pervasive problem akin to police lawlessness." P. Johnson, New Approaches to Enforcing the Fourth Amendment 8-10 (Sept. 1978) (unpublished working paper).
These suggestions apparently reflect a demeaning, stereotypical view of law enforcement officers
(at least in comparison to other occupational groups). To apply this stereotype as justification for
modifying the exclusionary rule while proclaiming that the modification reflects sympathy for
America's beleaguered police officers is ironic. If magistrates, judges and legislators in fact act
lawlessly much less often than police officers, application of the exclusionary rule to their actions
would not be at all harmful; this application merely would not lead to the exclusion of evidence
very often. Any remedial principle that is considered appropriate for police officers (be it the
traditional exclusionary rule or some new version) ought to apply equally to other public officials
who may authorize searches and seizures. One need not judge the relative frequency of misconduct by the members of various groups to conclude that the same deterrent and remedial principles should apply to the same misconduct.
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and acts openly in aid of law enforcement. . ..

It is reasonable for

police officers
to act upon the reports of such an observer of criminal
30
activity.

Another court has framed the rule somewhat differently:
A citizen eye-witness who, with no motive but public service, and without expectation of payment, identifies himself and volunteers information to the police has inherent credibility. Therefore the usual

showing prior reliability does not apply in these
requirement of
31
circumstances.

The judicially created rule concerning "citizen-informants"
provides useful general guidance to police officers. Nevertheless,
the person who appears at the Hill Street Precinct Station tomorrow
may be named Wolf Crier, and this citizen-informant may begin by
admitting that he often has made scurrilous and unsupported
charges against television personality Dinah Shore. The informant
may claim, however, that his days of fabrication are over. He also
may report that only an hour ago Justice Harry Blackmun, wearing
a judicial robe, dark glasses, a false beard and a grey fedora, assaulted him with a blackjack in an alley. The informant may note
that his identification of Justice Blackmun was confirmed when one
of the seven dwarfs who accompanied the miscreant addressed him
as "Harry." Although an officer who arrested Justice Blackmun on
the basis of this information could argue that the arrest was authorized by the "citizen-informant" rule as formulated by respected appellate courts, the arrest of Justice Blackmun certainly would have
been unreasonable. Police officers are not automatons. They can
recognize the need for departures from generally appropriate doctrines in exceptional circumstances. At the same time, the somewhat
tentative character of most judicial rules does not deprive these rules
of their ability to provide significant guidance to law enforcement
officers.
Sometimes, in fact, courts have failed to generalize when generalization would have been appropriate. As I have emphasized, the
development of judicial rules is desirable when the rules will yield
just results in a substantial majority of cases and when they can be
modified in the occasional cases in which they work unfairly. For
example, like the question of the credibility to be afforded "citizeninformants," the credibility of "first-time police informants" poses a
30. People v. Schulle, 51 Cal. App. 3d 809, 814, 124 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1975).
31. People v. Saars, 196 Colo. 294, 299, 584 P.2d 622, 626 (1978).
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recurring fourth amendment issue, yet the Supreme Court has failed
to resolve this issue in a way that offers clear guidance to police
officers and magistrates. The issue typically arises in cases in which
police officers have offered leniency or some other benefit to a person under arrest on the condition that he provide useful information-for example, that he reveal the identity of the person who sold
him the drugs that the officers have found in his possession. Is information provided by a "first-time police informant" sufficiently
credible in itself to supply probable cause for an arrest or search?
Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court had given a clear negative answer
to this question. The word of a police informant could be trusted if
the police had used this informant in the past and if his information
consistently had proven accurate, but officers were expected to confirm the statements of a first-time police informant through independent investigation before searching or arresting a person
32
whom he had identified.
In 1971, the Court apparently changed its position. In United
States v. Harris,33 a first-time informant told a federal tax investigator that he often had purchased bootleg whiskey from Roosevelt
Harris. 34 The affidavit filed by the investigator to support his application for a search warrant recited circumstances other than the informant's tip that might have contributed to a finding of probable
cause. The principal opinion in Harris, authored by Chief Justice
Burger, discussed each of these circumstances in detail. At the end
of his opinion, the Chief Justice considered the informant's statement. He wrote:
Here the warrant's affidavit recited extrajudicial statements of a declarant ... that ... he had many times and recently purchased "illicit
whiskey." These statements were against the informant's penal interest, for he thereby admitted major elements of an offense under the
Internal Revenue Code ....
Common sense in the important daily affairs of life would induce a
prudent and disinterested observer to credit these statements. People
do not lightly admit a crime and place critical evidence in the hands of
the police in the form of their own admissions. Admissions of crime,
like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of
credibility-sufficient at least to support finding of probable cause to
search .... Concededly admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another. But here the
32. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
33. 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
34. Id at 575.
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informant's admission that over a long period and currently he had
been buying illicit liquor on a certain premise, itself and without more,
35
implicated that property and furnished probable cause to search.

The portion of Chief Justice Burger's opinion that contained this
language wasjoined by only three other Justices, but lower courts
commonly have failed to consider that fact and have read the Chief
Justice's language as controlling. 36 Moreover, Justice Stewart, who
attached significant although not necessarily determinative weight
to the informant's supposed admission against penal interest, supplied the Court's fifth vote for a finding of probable cause. 37
The Chief Justice's opinion went beyond the necessities of the
case to declare that the first-time informant's statement alone would
have established probable cause, but the opinion's reasoning on this
issue seemed strained. If admissions of crime sometimes "carry
their own indicia of credibility," the reason is that people ordinarily
lack a motive for falsification when they make statements adverse to
their interests. Police informants, however, usually run a greater
risk of prosecution when they withhold "admissions against penal
interest" than when they make them. In the context of the police
informant system, admissions of crime often do not carry their own
"indicia of credibility" but quite the reverse.
Chief Justice Burger declared: "That the informant may be
paid or promised a 'break' does not eliminate the residual risk and
opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct." 38 This remarkable analysis accomplished a remarkable feat-it rendered the
Supreme Court's apparently new position on the weight to be accorded the statements of first-time informants nominally consistent
with the Court's prior decisions on the issue. Although the earlier
decisions had insisted that courts needed a specific reason to credit
an informant's statements before concluding that the statements established probable cause, they had not specifically considered the
35. Id.at 583-84.
36. E.g., United States v. Tucker, 526 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 958 (1976);
United States v. LaFond, 482 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Wis. 1980); People v. Neusom, 76 Cal. App. 3d
534, 143 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1977).
37. Justice Stewart joined a part of Chief Justice Burger's opinion that mentioned both the
informant's admission against interest and the general background of the suspect. See 403 U.S. at

577-80, 585.
38. 403 U.S. at 583-84. The fact that the informant apparently reduced rather than enhanced the risk of his own prosecution would have prevented his statement from being treated as
a declaration against penal interest under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 D. LOUISELL & C.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 489 (1980).
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possibility that an "admission against penal interest" would satisfy
this requirement.
Of course, a first-time police informant usually does admit his
criminal conduct when he implicates other people. Accordingly, the
apparent effect of the Harris decision was to justify a finding of
probable cause in almost every situation in which law enforcement
officers act on an informant's tip. When the informant is a "good
guy" not involved in criminal activity, the citizen-informant rule
usually will apply; when the informant is a "bad guy" who has participated in crime himself, the almost inevitable "admission against
interest" will establish the informant's credibility. 39 In this situation, the process of filing an affidavit for a search warrant is likely to
become merely a trap for an unwary police officer who fails to allege
all of the relevant circumstances, including his informant's "admissions against interest," in sufficient detail to justify a judicial finding
of probable cause. 4°
Chief Justice Burger did not discuss the credibility of first-time
informants in general terms in Harris. Instead, amidst a lengthy
discussion of the facts, he offered some apparently technical "law39. This wonderful "Catch 22" was illustrated by the opinion of the Colorado Supreme
Court in People v. Trontell, 188 Colo. 253, 533 P.2d 1124 (1975). The police had not used the
informant in Trontell previously; his reliability therefore had not been demonstrated by past success. The state nevertheless contended that the citizen-informant rule applied. It noted that the
informant was an eyewitness to the crime and that he had been identified by name in the affidavit
for a search warrant. The only difficulty was that the informant also had been a participant in the
crime, and the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the citizen-informant rule was not intended for this situation. The court nevertheless upheld the legality of the search on a different
ground; by admitting his participation in the crime, the informant had made a declaration against
his penal interest and thereby had established his reliability. The court enthusiastically applied
Harris although the police had struck an explicit bargain with the informant, promising him lenient treatment in exchange for his information.
40. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), seems
likely to put an end to demands for ever-greater detail in affidavits for search warrants. The Court
overruled the Aguillar-Spinelli doctrine which, as applied by many lower courts, had made the
drafting of these affidavits a technical exercise with standard forms and phrases reminiscent of
common law pleading. See, e.g., People v. Peschong, 181 Colo. 29, 506 P.2d 1232 (1973).
Gates's overruling ofAguilar-Spinelli may not have been as significant a development as some
of Gates's critics suggest; the combination of Harris'sruling on "admissions against penal interest"
and the "citizen informant" rule had emptied the so-called "reliability prong" ofAguilar-Spinei
of any coherent content a dozen years before Gates. Moreover, the "basis of knowledge" prong of
Aguilar-Spinelli had always seemed unsound. If, to take an extreme example, an anonymous
tipster called the police on 364 successive occasions and on each occasion accurately forecast a
specific crime, one would not need to know the basis of this person's knowledge to conclude that
his similar forecast on the 365th occasion deserved to be credited. For additional discussion of
Gates, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
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yer's talk" about admissions against penal and proprietary interest.
Moreover, shortly after declaring that "admissions of crime . . .
carry their own indicia of credibility-sufficient at least to support
finding of probable cause to search," the Chief Justice seemed to
contradict himself by writing: "Concededly admissions of crime do
credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations
not always lend
'41
of another.
The question of the first-time informant's credibility arises
daily in the administration of criminal justice, and both police officers and magistrates are entitled to an authoritative judicial resolution of this issue-a resolution that would not depend on efforts to
pierce the veil of artificial legal analysis but that might be qualified
in cases that depart from the usual pattern. Although I doubt that
even tentative and presumptive judicial rules can substantially refine the fourth amendment's rule of reason, some fourth amendment
issues do recur often enough to lend themselves to generalization;
and whenever fair generalization is possible, courts have a duty to
provide it.
C. Courts or Legislaturesas the Source of ProphylacticRules?
The judicial development of prophylactic rules raises a significant issue of institutional competency. The essence of the legislative
function is generalization; the essence of the judicial function is resolution of the case at hand. I do not contend (although others
have42) that the articulation of prophylactic rules in constitutional
adjudication is inherently inappropriate. On some occasions, detailed factual inquiry may not be worth even the time and energy of
the courts themselves. 43 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court ap41. Harris,403 U.S. at 584. Especially in view of the fact that first-time police informants do
not always make "admissions against penal interest," it is not surprising that sophisticated secondyear and third-year law students commonly study the Harris opinion without recognizing the
Supreme Court's apparent change of position on an important fourth amendment issue.
42. See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 612-13 (1973).
43. For example, a later portion of this article notes the proposal of Justice Powell for hearings on whether "ambiguous containers" like laundry bags and cardboard boxes have been kept in
such a way as to support reasonable expectations of privacy. See infra note 191 and accompanying text. Justice Powell observed:
Relevant to such an inquiry should be the size, shape, material, and condition of the
exterior, the context within which it is discovered, and whether the possessor had taken
some significant precaution, such as locking, securely sealing or binding the container,
that indicates a desire to prevent the contents from being displayed upon simple
mischance.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 n.3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring). Even if Justice Pow-
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peared to offer prophylactic protection to the rights of criminal suspects in Miranda v. Arizona,a critics complained that the Court had
converted the Bill of Rights into a code of criminal procedure. 45
These critics certainly were correct that, wherever the far-frombright line boundary between the legislative and judicial functions
should be drawn, courts should have less freedom than legislatures
to develop artificial rules that deliberately sacrifice justice in individual cases for the sake of administrative simplicity. I mention this
issue of institutional responsibility only to note that I will not pursue
it in any depth in this article. As indicated, my argument will be
that "bright line" fourth amendment rules usually fail on their own
terms regardless of the authority that promulgates them.
D. Rules That Restrict or Rules That Expand Police Authority?
Bright line fourth amendment rules come in two forms. The
first declares that a search or seizure will be held unconstitutional
although it might be judged reasonable if viewed in isolation. The
theory underlying this first type of rule is that a seemingly reasonable search or seizure is part of a broader category of police action
that usually is unfair. A bright line rule condemning the entire class
of behavior is necessary to provide appropriate guidance. The second form of bright line rule upholds police actions that might be
held unconstitutional if judged solely on their facts. It rests on the
theory that these seemingly unreasonable police actions are part of a
broader class of police behavior that merits categorical approval.
This second form of bright line rule plainly does not confine police
discretion but expands it beyond the limits that a regime of case-bycase adjudication would establish.
It may not be entirely coincidental that most of the Supreme
Court's current bright line rules tell police officers, "Yes, you may
search," rather than, "No, you may not." The sole exception is a
doctrine that might be characterized as a pseudo-bright line rule-a
rule whose categorical clarity is more a wish than a reality. This
rule antedates the significant changes in the Court's composition
that occurred during the Nixon presidency. Although recently reafell's approach were sound in theory, I doubt that the hearings that he proposed would be worth
the cost. A prophylactic rule affording constiutional protection to all closed, opaque containers
might well be worthwhile.
44. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
45. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of CriminalProcedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929
(1965).
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firmed by the Supreme Court, 46 its status has even more recently
been called into question.47 This rule proclaims that the constitutional term "probable cause" establishes a "single familiar standard" for lawful searches and arrests in an extraordinary variety of
situations. Because the concept of probable cause lies at the heart of
the fourth amendment and because the meaning of this concept is
relevant to several of the cases discussed in this article, it is appropriate to begin an examination of the Supreme Court's bright line
decisions with the Court's interpretation of "probable cause."
III.

THE "SINGLE FAMILIAR STANDARD" OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
V. NEW YORK
DUNAAWY

As a majority of the Supreme Court view the facts in Dunaway
v. New York, 48 the defendant was involuntarily detained, placed in
a squad car, driven to police headquarters, confined in an interrogation room, advised of his Miranda rights49 and questioned. The
state of New York did not contend that probable cause for the defendant's arrest arose until he made an incriminating statement
shortly after his confinement at the station house. The state argued
instead that the defendant's detention for questioning was not an
arrest and that this detention without probable cause was permissible "because the police had a 'reasonable suspicion' that petitioner
possessed 'intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved
crime.' "50
In advancing this argument, the state relied primarily on the
Supreme Court's 1968 ruling in Terry v. Ohio.5 Terry had said that
when a law enforcement officer could "point to specific and articulable facts which. . . reasonably warrant [the] intrusion," 52 he could
stop and detain a suspect briefly in the absence of probable cause.
Moreover, the officer could conduct a "patdown" of the suspect for
weapons if he had "reason to believe that he [was] dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual. '53 The Court recognized that the
46. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). See infra notes 48-113 and accompanying
text.
47. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983); infra note 98 and accompanying text.
48. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
49. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
50. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 207.

51. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
52. Id at 21.
53. Id at 27.
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"stop" upheld in Terry was a seizure governed by fourth amendment standards and that the officer's "frisk" of the suspect was a
search. It concluded, however, that both of these actions should "be
tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures" rather than by the standard of
probable cause.
In Dunaway, the Supreme Court described the stop-and-frisk
issue presented in Terry as sui generis,5 4 added that the rule of that
case was "an exception to the general rule requiring probable
cause," 55 and observed that the Court had been "careful to maintain
[this exception's] narrow scope." 56 The Supreme Court held the detention in Dunaway unconstitutional and said:
The familiar threshold standard of probable cause for Fourth Amendment seizures ... provides the relative simplicity and clarity necessary
to the implementation of a workable rule ....
In effect, respondent urges us to adopt a multifactor balancing test

of "reasonable police conduct under the circumstances" to cover all
seizures that do not amount to technical arrests. But the protections

intended by the Framers could all too easily disappear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing may be done in the first
instance by police officers engaged in "the often competitive enterprise
of ferreting out crime." . . . A single, familiar standard is essential to
guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect

on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront. . . . For all but [a few] narrowly
defined intrusions, the requisite "balancing" . . . is embodied in the
principle
that seizures are "reasonable" only if supported by probable
57
cause.

Under the Supreme Court's view of the facts (a view disputed
by the dissenting Justices), the Court's condemnation of the detention in Dunaway seemed sound.58 Indeed, Dunaway might have
been decided under the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination rather than the fourth amendment's prohibition of unreasonable seizures, for the notion of an involuntary detention for
the purpose of obtaining a voluntary confession would be likely to
54.
55.
56.
57.

Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209.

Id at 210.
Id
Id at 213-14.

58. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, contended that the defendant in Dunaway had not been detained but that he had agreed voluntarily to accompany the officers. id at
221-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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find favor only in the writings of George Orwell, Lewis Carroll or
overzealous New York prosecutors. 59 Moreover, the detention in
Dunaway was so little different from a "technical arrest" that the
state's argument that it should be judged by an entirely different
standard seemed strained.
At the same time, the Supreme Court's view of the probable
cause requirement as a bright line principle seemed inappropriate.
The concept of probable cause can be interpreted sensibly only as
an embodiment of the "multifactor balancing test" that the Court
rejected in Dunaway. Rather than permit departures from the probable cause requirement in exceptional circumstances, courts should
read this requirement to accommodate the needs of law enforcement
and the protection of individual privacy in every situation governed
by the fourth amendment.
What was the "single familiar standard" to which the Supreme
Court referred in Dunaway? Apparently this standard was so familiar that the Court sensed no need to define it. In other cases, however, the Court had held that probable cause to arrest exists when
the "facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent
man in believing that [an] offense has been committed" and that the
person to be arrested committed it.60 Similarly, lower courts have
said that probable cause to search exists "when circumstances
known to a police officer are such as to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that [the] search would reveal incriminating evidence."61 One plausible construction of this language would
be that a person could not lawfully be arrested unless his guilt appeared more probable than not, and a search could not lawfully be
undertaken unless it appeared more probable than not that this
search would be successful. Although this interpretation of the
Supreme Court's language is not inevitable, some courts have defined the probable cause standard in exactly this way. 62 Moreover,
unless the Court's language implies a "more probable than not"
59. Justice White also may have intimated approval of the concept. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 34-35 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
60. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959). See Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645
(1878); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307, 313 (1959); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
61. Eg., United States v. McEachin, 670 F.2d 1139, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
62. E.g., State v. Sheppard, 35 Or. App. 69, 72-73, 581 P.2d 549, 551 (1978) ("more likely
than not"); People v. Montoya, 114 Cal. App. 3d 556, 562, 170 Cal. Rptr. 624, 626 (1981) ("more
evidence than 'equal' evidence").
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standard, it does not establish a "bright line" or easily understood
principle at all. At the very least, the Court's language suggests that
some uniform degree of persuasion is essential to a finding of probable cause in every situation in which this finding is required.
A unitary view of the probable cause requirement leads, however, to incongruous results. On some occasions, a greater than fifty
percent probability that a search will be successful may not be sufficient to justify it. A classic illustration arises when police officers
rely upon highly generalized statistical evidence to establish prob63
able cause for a search or arrest. In a well-worn hypothetical case,
social scientists whose research methods are beyond challenge have
reported that between the hours of 7:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on any
given evening a majority of black males between the ages of sixteen
and twenty-five on the streets of a particular neighborhood carry
concealed weapons-a criminal offense. A police officer claims
probable cause for a search or arrest simply because he knew the
survey results and because, in addition, he knew that the person
whom he searched or arrested was a twenty-year-old black male on
the streets of this neighborhood at 10:00 p.m.. Surely one's inclination in this situation is to insist that evidence cannot establish probable cause unless it differentiates the person searched or arrested
from other members of a broad demographic group. Moreover, one
is likely to be especially suspicious of racial and gender-based classifications of the sort employed in this case. On some occasions, a
standard of "more probable than not" apparently demands too
little.
In other situations, however, a search may be reasonable although the probability of its success is much less than fifty percent.
Imagine that an informant whose past statements have been consistently reliable has reported that a bomb is set to explode in one of the
rented lockers in a major New York airport. The only difficulty is
that the informant does not know which locker contains the bomb,
and 150 lockers have been rented. The opening of each locker
would invade the privacy of a distinct individual and almost certainly would constitute a separate search. Moreover, the chance that
the bomb would be found in any one locker would be no better than
63. Although I did not invent this case, I do not know who did. Justice Brennan seemed to
advert to it in his dissenting opinion in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 572 n.2
(1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Bacigal, The FourthAmendment in Flux The Rise and
Fall ofProbable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 775.
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one in 150. Could a smaller than one percent chance amount to
probable cause for a search? In this situation, of course it could.
One reason for permitting the search of 150 or more rented
lockers when one locker apparently contains a bomb would be that
this action might prevent imminent public harm; the police would
not simply be seeking evidence to prosecute someone for a past offense such as a bombing that occurred last month. Plainly, the concept of probable cause should be sufficiently flexible to recognize
this critical difference in circumstances. 64 At the same time, most
criminal law enforcement is designed to prevent future public harm
at least in part, and a case-by-case assessment of the potential severity of the harm that a search might prevent seems almost unavoidable. If an informant had told the police, not that a bomb was
located in one of the lockers, but that a small-time drug dealer had
stored an ounce or two of marijuana there, the potential gain to law
enforcement almost certainly would not warrant invading the privacy of many innocent people. If, however, the police knew that the
Mafia's largest heroin shipment of the decade was inside one of
those lockers, the case for permitting the search would be substantially stronger. Allowing this heroin to reach the streets might not
be as harmful as permitting a bomb to explode, but some would
dispute the point. The differences among these various cases do not
seem subtle, finespun, hair-splitting or recondite. It is difficult to
understand how the cases can yield to a "single familiar standard."
As the concept of probable cause is usually defined, the seriousness of the harm that the police seek to prevent or of the offense that
they wish to investigate does not seem to enter the constitutional
calculus. Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances warrant a prudent person's belief that an offense has been or is being
committed. Apparently, it does not matter what offense it is. Dissenting in Brinegarv. UnitedStates,65 Justice Jackson challenged the
appropriateness of this view and voiced sentiments that appeal
strongly to a basic sense of decency. He hypothesized a situation in
64. An anonymous tip ordinarily cannot supply probable cause for a search until it has been
verified in significant part by independent investigation. Nevertheless, when an anonymous caller
reported that a named student was carrying a firearm on the premises of a public school, the
Illinois Supreme Court concluded that probable cause had been established. People v. Boykin, 39
Ill. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968). Although the Boykin ruling afforded a troublesome power to
faceless accusers, the ruling was probably sensible in light of the risks of police inaction when a
very serious harm is threatened.
65. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
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which the police had thrown a roadblock around a neighborhood
and searched every outgoing car in an effort to prevent the escape of
a kidnapper who was still holding his victim. Justice Jackson said
that he would strive to sustain this action but added that he would
not "strain to sustain such a. . .universal search to salvage a few
bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger." 66
So far as I am aware, Justice Jackson has been the only member of the Supreme Court ever to declare that the seriousness of the
threatened harm might be an important consideration in judging the
reasonableness of a search. On at least one occasion, however, the
Court itself has acted on the same principle. In United States v.
United States District Court,67 the Supreme Court held that in the
absence of judicial authorization the President and other members
of the Executive Branch have no inherent power to engage in electronic surveillance to guard against violent overthrow of the government. The Court suggested that the customary warrant procedure
would not prove unduly burdensome in this context and observed:
We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different
policy and practical considerations from the surveillance of "ordinary
crime." The gathering of security intelligence is often long range and
involves the interrelation of various sources and types of information.
The exact targets of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify
than in surveillance operations against many [other] types of crime
.... Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on
the prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government's preparedness for some possible future crisis or emergency.
Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may be less68 precise than that
directed against more conventional types of crimes.
One can read this language to say that although the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement is not subject to a "domestic security" exception, there is a "domestic security" exception to the requirement that warrants may issue only upon probable cause. If
probable cause were a "single familiar standard," the establishment
of a separate standard for "domestic security" cases obviously
would violate the Constitution. If, however, the term "probable
cause" permits judges to consider the distinct dangers posed by differing crimes, the Supreme Court's recognition that domestic secur66. Id at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
67. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
68. Id at 322.
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ity cases may not present the same fourth amendment issues as
gambling cases would seem appropriate.
Even if one recognizes the appropriateness of a "sliding scale"
of probable cause, one can sensibly dispute the merits of the Court's
suggestion that electronic surveillance in domestic security cases is
significantly different from electronic surveillance in other cases.
Although the violent overthrow of the government is obviously a
more serious evil than the shipment of dice across a state line, the
threat of this evil in most domestic security cases is remote. Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized in United States District Court
that surveillance in national security cases is likely to pose a special
danger to constitutionally protected speech.69 One therefore might
view the opinion in United States District Court as an illustration of
the perils inherent in an open-ended concept of probable cause.
This concept would indeed allow judges to subordinate the protection of privacy to their transient pet phobias. To entrust the security
of persons, houses, papers and effects to mere judges is terrifying; all
of us would prefer a government of laws.
Nevertheless, the pretense that probable cause is a "single familiar standard" did not prevent the Supreme Court from writing
the opinion that it wrote in United States District Court. A riddle
attributed to Abraham Lincoln asks, "How many legs would a lamb
have if you called the tail a leg?" Lincoln's answer was that calling
the tail a leg does not make it one. 70 Similarly, the Supreme Court's
insistence that probable cause is a "single familiar standard" cannot
make the essentially undefined constitutional language a unitary,
bright line concept. Proclaiming that "the term 'probable cause'
rings a bell of certainty," as Justice Douglas did in a dissenting
opinion in Terry v. Ohio,7 1 is unlikely to lead any judge to condemn
as unreasonable a search that the judge considers reasonable. Justice Douglas's bell of certainty may not ring in the judge's ears; he
may march to the tinkle of a different glockenspiel.
The seriousness of the evil that a search or seizure might prevent is probably a less important determinant of the quantum of
evidence necessary to justify it than the extent to which this search
or seizure would intrude upon privacy, liberty or property. In
69. Id at 313-14.
70. 1 C. SANDBURG, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE WAR YEARs 570 (1939).
71. 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Terry,72 the Supreme Court recognized that a "stop" could be reasonable although the available evidence would not justify an "arrest." In other words, relatively minor governmental intrusions can
be justified by less persuasive evidence than would be required for
more substantial intrusions. Rather than accommodate the competing interests within the probable cause framework, however, the
Court insisted that probable cause was not always the constitutionally required standard. The Court apparently sought to preserve the
"bright line" character of the probable cause concept by creating a
two-tiered fourth amendment-probable cause for some intrusions,
reasonable suspicion for others.
Of course, the fourth amendment mentions probable cause only
to say that no warrants shall issue without it. The Terry opinion
explained:
If this case involved police conduct subject to the Warrant Clause of
the Fourth Amendment, we would have to ascertain whether "probable
cause" existed to justify the search and seizure which took place. However, that is not the case. We do not retreat from our holdings that the

police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, . . . or that in
most instances failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only
be excused by exigent circumstances ....
But we deal here with an
entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected
to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case
must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against
73
unreasonable searches and seizures.

The fact that the police officer in Terry could not have obtained
a warrant without risking both the commission of a robbery and the
escape of the robbers plainly justified his failure to obtain a warrant.
Nevertheless, the officer's inability to obtain a warrant had no bearing on the quantum of evidence necessary to justify his detention of
the defendant. The Supreme Court's analysis seems to indicate that
actions not subject to the warrant clause should be tested only by
"the Fourth Amendment's general proscription [of] unreasonable
searches and seizures." Prior to Terry, however, the Supreme Court
had said that the evidentiary standard for a warrantless search or
seizure could be no less stringent than that necessary to justify a
72. Id at 26-27.
73. Id at 20.
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search or seizure with a warrant. 74
A departure from this pre-Terry view would have represented a
radical reinterpretation of the fourth amendment, and it is doubtful
that the Supreme Court intended this reinterpretation. Consider,
for example, the Supreme Court's ruling that a police officer need
not have a warrant to make a felony arrest in a public place even if
he has ample opportunity to obtain one. 75 Does it follow from this
ruling and from the Supreme Court's analysis in Terry that a felony
arrest in a public place should be tested only by a standard of reasonableness and that such an arrest may be made without probable
cause? It was incongruous for the Court to indicate in Terry that a
police officer needed a great deal of evidence when he had time to
obtain a warrant and a smaller amount of evidence when he did not.
A better ruling would have been that the quantum of evidence necessary to justify a search or seizure is unaffected by an officer's ability to obtain a warrant but that probable cause is an inherently
flexible concept that demands less evidence for some intrusions than
for others.
This point becomes critical when exigent circumstances are
lacking and when courts attempt to control less intrusive police actions through the warrant procedure. The defendant in Davis v.
Mississoppi7 6 was one of twenty-four black youths whom law enforcement officers had rounded up for interrogation and fingerprinting following a rape. Although the defendant's arrest was plainly
invalid, the Supreme Court indicated in dictum that a state might
devise a constitutional procedure for detaining a suspect to obtain
his fingerprints when, in the Court's words, "there is no probable
cause in the traditional sense. ' 77 The Court added, however, "[T]he
general requirement that the authorization of a judicial officer be
obtained in advance of detention would seem not to admit of any
exception in the fingerprinting context."78
The fourth amendment says expressly that "no warrants shall
79
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."
Endorsing use of the warrant procedure when probable cause is
lacking would be inconsistent with this command. Of course, a
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
394 U.S. at 721 (1969).
Id at 727.
Id at 728.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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court could authorize the brief detention of a suspect when the evidence would not justify his arrest and could require the issuance of
a warrant as a prerequiste to this detention. The court could render
this procedure consistent with the Constitution, however, only by
recognizing the flexibility of the probable cause concept. Rather
than speak of probable cause to believe, the court might speak of
probable cause to do. It might recognize that probable cause to do
one thing (for example, to stop a suspect or to detain him for fingerprinting) may differ from probable cause to do something else (for
example, to arrest the suspect and charge him with a crime). Under
this view, probable cause would mean "good reason," no more and
no less. Unlike the two-tiered view of the fourth amendment advanced in Terry and Dunaway, this interpretation of the amendment
would not force a court to abandon use of the warrant procedure
whenever it permitted a police action on the basis of less persuasive
evidence than would be required for an arrest.
In a case decided only a year before Terry, the Supreme Court
endorsed the flexible reading of the probable cause requirement that
80
Terry and Dunaway disclaimed. In Camara v. Municipal Court,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of administrative housing inspections despite the absence of articulable reasons for suspecting
building code violations within particular dwellings. At the same
time, the Court ruled that homeowners are entitled to demand
search warrants before allowing these inspections. The Camara
opinion explained:
Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails ....
Having concluded that the area inspection is a "reasonable" search
of private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is
obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an

area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. 8'

In very broad terms, courts might develop a "test" of probable
cause analogous to the formula that Judge Learned Hand once proposed as a definition of negligence. 82 This test would ask whether
80. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
81. Id at 536-37, 538.
82. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 1 am grateful
to Professor Alan Meisel for suggesting that the "Hand formula" might be profitably applied to
the determination of probable cause.
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the evil that a search or seizure might prevent, multiplied by the
strength of the evidence justifying the intrusion, would be greater
than or less than the impairment of privacy or property that the
search or seizure would entail. As Judge Hand recognized with respect to his negligence formula, this test would call for the balancing
of values both unmeasurable and incommensurate. 83 Moreover,
even this rather blurry formula would fail to capture all of the circumstances that might become relevant: for example, whether some
less restrictive alternative could accomplish the government's objective, whether the timing of the proposed search or seizure was appropriate, and whether the evidence supporting the search or seizure
differentiated the target of the government's action from other memgroup or was instead of a highly generbers of a broad demographic
84
alized statistical character.
Although no comprehensive history of the probable cause requirement has yet been written,8 5 the origins of this requirement are
apparently as old as Bracton's mid-thirteenth century treatise On the
Laws and Customs of England. Bracton declared that a person
could be proclaimed an outlaw on the basis of "presumptive cause"
and that this proclamation would be valid although it later developed that no crime had been committed. 86 By the time of Sir
Mathew Hale's treatise in the seventeenth century, the concept of
"probable cause" had become a test of the legality of searches and
arrests in a number of situations. 87 Apparently the single, familiar
standard of Dunaway v. New York was not yet familiar, however.
Hale spoke consistently of "probable cause to suspect" rather than
"probable cause to believe," and his illustrations revealed that probable cause was not always an extremely demanding concept. For
example, if one member of a gang of robbers had been identified
and if a second person later were found traveling in his company,
these facts alone would justify an arrest of the known robber's traveling companion. 88
83. See Conway v. O'Brien, 11 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940) (L. Hand, J.); Moisan v. Loftus,
178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
84. See infra note 138 and accompanying text; see alsosupra note 63 and accompanying text.
85. A useful preliminary sketch is Weber, The Birth ofProbable Cause, I1 ANGLO-AM. L.
REV. 155 (1982).
86. 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGIBUs ET CONSUETUDINIBus ANGLIAE 356 (S. Thorne trans.

1968).
87.

2 M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98-104 (London 1778).

88. Id at 81.
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Other sources confirmed that very little evidence could establish probable cause in the pre-revolutionary period. Several authorities declared that, so long as an offense had been committed, the
common opinion of the public that a particular person had committed it would justify his arrest. 89 "Generally keeping company with
persons of scandalous reputation" also could be sufficient, 90 as could
remaining silent in the face of an accusation of serious crime. 91
In the period just before the American Revolution, in both
England and America, oppressive governmental searches led defenders of the rights of English subjects to insist upon the importance of the probable cause requirement. The grievance of these
forebearers of the Revolution, however, was the asserted power of
executive officers to search and seize simply upon unsupported suspicion. The issue was whether any evidentiary basis would be required to authorize searches and seizures, not what quantum of
evidence would be necessary. No materials of which I am aware
suggest that the pre-Revolutionary concept of probable cause was a
unitary standard rather than a flexible requirement of case-by-case
92
justification.
The pre-Revolutionary concept of probable cause seemed to
embody the same judgment that the Supreme Court expressed in
1931: "There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness.
89. Conductor Generalis,or Office, Duty andAuthority of Justicesofthe Peace (written about
1749) (quotedinWeber, supra note 85, at 158); M. DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 277 (1622); 2
W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 118 (8th ed. 1824) (n.p., n.d., written in 1716); 1 R. BURN,
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 292 (30th ed. 1869). See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 599-600 (3d ed. 1922).
90. 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 89, at 118.
91. Id For an illustration of how a little evidence might prompt an eighteenth-century magistrate to order an arrest, see Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial- A View
from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 90 (1983) (describing the arrest of Charles Cane in
1756).
92. In Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (1763), Lord Chief Justice Pratt declared that
the "discretionary power" of law enforcement officers to act "wherever theirsuspicions may chance
to fall" was "totally subversive of the liberty of the suspect." Id at 1167 (emphasis added).
Wilkes wrote in 1762, "To take any man into custody ... without having some seemingfoundation
at least, on which to justify such a step, is inconsistent with wisdom and sound policy." J.
WILKES, THE LIFE AND POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN WILKES 372 (1773) (emphasis added).
The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted on June 12, 1776, proclaimed that "general warrants,

whereby any officer or messenger may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence
ofafact committed.., are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted." The Constitution of Virginia in 7 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS 3814 (1909) (emphasis added). The historic battle was between those
who insisted on the common law requirement that a search or seizure be justified on its facts and
those who claimed that a general warrant could obviate the need for case-by-case justification.
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Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances."

93

Indeed, the Supreme Court reiterated this traditional view as recently as three weeks before the decision in Dunaway. The Court
said in Bell v. Wofish, 94 "The test of reasonableness under the
Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechani-

cal application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need to
search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." 95 Moreover, several years after Dunaway, the Supreme Court
apparently returned to this view in Illinois v. Gates.9 6 Without mentioning Dunaway and its "single familiar standard," the Court de-

clared, "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept-turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts-not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. ' 97 It added,
"There are so many variables in the probable cause equation that
one determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for
98
another."
Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam once referred to "the monstrous abyss of a graduated fourth amendment.

. .

splendid in its

flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability,
unenforcibility and general ooziness." 99 He also observed that a
sliding scale would "produce more slide than scale"'0 and that it
would convert the fourth amendment into an "immense Rorschach

blot." 0 These wonderful phrases make a significant point. Nevertheless, at the same time that Professor Amsterdam insisted that
levels ofjustification under the fourth amendment must be confined
to a small and manageable number of categories, he failed to indi93. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931). Remarkably, Justice
Brennan, the author of the Dunaway opinion, has cited this language with approval when the
Supreme Court has announced bright line rules that he does not like. New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 464 n.l (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 238 (1973) (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
94. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
95. Id at 559.
96. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
97. Id at 2328.
98. Id at 2332 n.1 I. Gates may have moved a bit too far from the bright line approach of
Dunaway. The Court's opinion insisted repeatedly on an examination of the totality of the circumstances and did not seem to recognize the utility of subordinate, presumptive rules for the
resolution of recurring fourth amendment issues. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
On the whole, however, the Supreme Court's apparent recovery from a bad case of bright line
fever seems a cause for rejoicing.
99. Amsterdam, supra note 4, at 415.
100. Id at 394.
101. Id at 393.
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cate what the nonwoolly content of any one of these categories
might be.
Moreover, Professor Amsterdam's captivating imagery may exaggerate the extent to which a regime of case-by-case adjudication
would leave law enforcement officers sliding without scale into the
monstrous abyss. As this article had indicated, courts sometimes
can give law enforcement officers significant guidance within a
framework of case-by-case adjudication by establishing
subordinate, presumptive rules for the resolution of recurring fourth
amendment issues. Although the effort to develop a grand, unitary
definition of probable cause may be hopeless, generalization about
the credibility of "citizen informants" and of "first-time police informants" is probably feasible. In addition, every ruling in a system of
case-by-case adjudication becomes part of a dialogue between
judges and law enforcement officers. This dialogue can-and has in
fact--established standards that may not be subject to precise
verbalization. All of us can recognize that the roundup of twentyfour suspects in Davis v. Mississoipi 10 2 lacked probable cause, yet
none of us may be able to define the critical constitutional term or
articulate with precision the standard that we have employed. The
reason for our common understanding is not that the roundup
would have been indefensible if its costs and benefits had been judged afresh; this highly intrusive police action did enable law enforcement officers to apprehend the perpetrator of a brutal crime.
Nevertheless, a long course of adjudication under the fourth amendment had given expression to a set of values, and this course of adjudication had effectively settled the probable cause issue in Davis
before it arose. Our traditional regime of case-by-case adjudication
plainly does communicate. It is wrong to imagine that communication always must take the form of bright line rules.
IV.

SEARCHES INCIDENT TO DETENTIONS:

UNITED

STATES V ROBINSON

In UnitedStates v. Robinson,10 3 a motorist was arrested for operating a motor vehicle after the revocation of his operator's permit.
It was undisputed that the arrest was valid, that the arresting officer
properly made a custodial arrest rather than issue a traffic citation,
and that the officer lawfully subjected the motorist to a Terry-type
102. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
103. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
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frisk before transporting him to the station house. The arresting officer, however, went beyond a frisk of the motorist for weapons. He
reached inside the motorist's pocket, removed a crumpled cigarette
package, opened this package and discovered unlawful drugs. The
issue was whether this search of the motorist's person could be justified as an incident of his arrest.
Four years before Robinson, the Supreme Court had reviewed
the doctrine of searches incident to arrest in Chimel v. California.0 4
It had recognized that these searches serve two distinct purposes:
[I]t is reasonable for [an] arresting officer to search the person arrested
in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's
person in order to prevent its concealment or
05
destruction.

Noting that "[t]he scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible"10 6 and that "the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption
[from the warrant requirement] to show the need for it,"' 107 the
Court held in Chimel that a search incident to arrest could not extend beyond an arrestee's person and "the area from within which
he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."' 08
In Robinson, there was no suggestion that the challenged search
could have prevented the concealment or destruction of evidence of
the offense for which the defendant had been arrested. 0 9 The defendant contended, in addition, that the arresting officer's frisk had
eliminated the possibility that the defendant might use a weapon to
resist arrest or effect an escape. Although it is far from clear that the
Supreme Court relied on a self-protective rationale when it upheld
the search in Robinson, the Court did discuss this issue. The Court's
earlier opinion in Terry had said that a frisk for weapons could adequately protect the safety of an officer who had stopped and detained a suspect, but the majority in Robinson concluded that Terry
was inapposite. "It is scarcely open to doubt," the majority said,
"that the danger to an officer is far greater in the case of the ex104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id at 763.
Id at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
Id at 762 (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
Id at 763.
See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody
and transporting him to the police station than in the case of the
relatively fleeting contact resulting from the typical Terry-type
0
stop."11
One hesitates to doubt something that the Supreme Court has
said is scarcely open to doubt; but when a suspect has been frisked
and his knives, clubs and guns have been removed, transporting him
to the station house does not seem to pose a notable danger of assault with a knife, club or gun. Perhaps the Court was concerned
about smaller weapons that might be missed in a patdown searchsuch weapons as razor blades and safety pins. Even the dissenting
Justices in Robinson seemed to acknowledge that these weapons
posed a salient danger."' Few traffic offenders seem likely to be
armed with concealed safety pins or razor blades, however; and it is
difficult to visualize an offender withdrawing a safety pin and announcing to an officer, "Don't move. I've got you covered." To be
sure, an arrestee who took an officer by surprise might inflict a serious injury with a razor blade or other small weapon-but probably
not a serious enough injury to prevent the wounded officer from
shooting the arrestee in his tracks as he fled. For a person under
arrest to attack an armed officer with a safety pin or razor blade
would be madness, and I am not persuaded that law enforcement
officers need worry a great deal about the danger. Moreover, when
an officer does remain apprehensive after a careful frisk, he can
handcuff an arrestee and lock him in the sealed rear seat of a patrol
car. In Robinson, the government conceded that the arresting officer
had not been searching for weapons and that the officer had not in
l 2
fact been motivated by a sense of imminent danger."
A self-protective rationale for the search in Robinson therefore
would have been strained; and, as I read the Supreme Court's opinion, it did not assert any self-protective justification for the search in
that case. Instead, the Court relied both on the dubious proposition
that a full search of the person had been a recognized incident of
custodial arrest throughout our legal history" 3 and on the perceived
110.

Id
I11. Id
112. Id
113. Id
the following

at 234-35 (majority opinion).
at 254 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
at 236 n.7 (majority opinion).
at 224. The Court advanced this contention although the dissenting Justices quoted
language from an 1853 English case:
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need for bright line standards. Apparently, from the Court's perspective, even treating traffic arrests as a class would have drawn too
fine a line. The Robinson opinion observed:
[O]ur more fundamental disagreement with the Court of Appeals arises
from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue of
whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful arrest. . .. A
police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person
of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick adhoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken

down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search ...
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful,
a
4
search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification."1

Although the dissenting Justices argued that "[tihe majority's
attempt to avoid case-by-case adjudication. . . is doomed to fail as
a matter of practical application," 5 I believe that Robinson did establish an easily administered rule. Nevertheless, Robinson went
beyond the appropriate judicial practice of affording law enforcement officers the benefit of the doubt in matters of self-protection

and permitted these officers to engage in undisguised fishing expeditions and even in gratuitous harrassment." 6
Five years before Robinson, in Terry v. Ohio,117 the Supreme
Court had considered a police action that, judged on its facts,
seemed clearly reasonable. A single officer had stopped and frisked
three suspects who had given strong indication that they were about
to commit an armed robbery. This officer's carefully timed intervention and limited searches had illustrated the ability of capable
law enforcement officers to provide appropriate, measured reWith respect to searching a prisoner, there is no doubt that a man when in custody
may so conduct himself, by reason of violence of language or conduct, that a police
officer may reasonably think it prudent and right to search him, in order to ascertain
whether he has any weapon with which he might do mischief to the person or commit a
breach of the peace; but at the same time it is quite wrong to suppose that a general rule
can be applied to such a case. Even when a man is confined for being drunk and disorderly, it is not correct to say that he must submit to the degradation of being searched, as
the searching of such a person must depend upon allthe circumstances of the case.
Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox C. C. 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853) (quoted in Robinson, 414 U.S. at 247 n.2
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
114. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (majority opinion).
115. Id at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
116. See White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of
Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 165, 185-216.
117. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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sponses even in difficult, fast-breaking situations. At the time of the
Terry decision, however, abuse of the power to stop and frisk was,
with good reason, a significant grievance of many inner-city residents and civil rights groups. 118 The Supreme Court might have
written an opinion in Terry declaring it categorically unreasonable
to stop and frisk in the absence of probable cause for arrest. Had
the Court written this bright line opinion in an effort to provide guidance for law enforcement officers, and had the Court therefore
condemned the police action in Terry, the general reaction probably
would have been one of outrage; and the outrage would have been
justified. Nevertheless, treating all stops as a class would have been
analogous to treating all searches incident to arrest as a class--exactly what the Supreme Court later did in Robinson. The language
of Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Terry may offer an appropriate
counterpoint both to the decision in Robinson and to the perceived
need for bright line standards that informed the Robinson ruling.
The exclusionary rule. . . cannot properly be invoked to exclude the
products of legitimate police investigative techniques on the ground
that much conduct which is closely similar involves unwarranted intru-

sion upon constitutional protections.

. ..

No judicial opinion can com-

prehend the protean variety of the street encounter, and we can only
judge the facts of the case before us." 19

V.

DETENTIONS INCIDENT TO SEARCHES: MICHIGAN V
SUMMERS

Because the Justices of the Supreme Court have contracted
bright line fever and seem not to care very much about the facts of
individual cases, it is difficult to tell from the Court's opinion what
happened in Michigan v. Summers. 20 The text of this opinion devoted only three sentences to its description of the facts:
As Detroit police officers were about to execute a warrant to search a
house for narcotics, they encountered respondent descending the front
steps. They requested his assistance in gaining entry and detained him
while they searched the premises. After finding narcotics in the basement and ascertaining that respondent owned the house, the police arrested him, searched his person, and found in his coat pocket an
118. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. THE POLICE 184 (1967).
119. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15.
120. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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envelope containing 8.5 grams of heroin.12 1

Neither the Court's opinion nor that of the three dissenting Justices
indicated what had led to the initial finding of probable cause for
the narcotics search. Both opinions apparently assumed that although the police had good reason to believe that narcotics would
be found inside the house, they had not received any advance indication of whose drugs they might be. t22 The Court's statement of
facts indicated that the police failed to discover that the defendant
owned the house until after they had detained him and searched the
premises. 23 Nevertheless, a footnote to the Court's opinion reported that the police knew at the time of the initial detention that
the defendant resided in the house. 124 Another footnote revealed
in addition to
that the police detained seven occupants of the house
25
the defendant while they conducted their search.
The majority and dissenting opinions agreed that the determinative issue in Summers was the propriety of the initial seizure of
the defendant and his detention while the police conducted their
search. Moreover, both opinions agreed that this seizure and detention were not supported by probable cause. Although the record in
Summers did not reveal the length of the defendant's detention, the
dissent noted that narcotics searches commonly continue for
hours. 126 The detention in Summers therefore seemed more intrusive than the streetcorner stop-and-frisk that Terry had permitted
without probable cause. At the same time, this detention seemed
less intrusive than the station house detention that Dunaway had
condemned because the probable cause standard had not been satisfied. Neither Terry nor Dunaway seemed to control the resolution
of the issue before the Court.
The majority noted that "some seizures admittedly covered by
the Fourth Amendment... may be made on less than probable
cause, so long as police have an articulable basis for suspecting
criminal activity."' 127 It concluded that the detention in Summers,
like the stop in Terry, was one of these seizures. The majority de121. Id at 693.
122. This assumption was, however, inaccurate. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
123. Again, the Court's view of the facts may have been inaccurate. See infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
124. Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.4.
125. Id at 693 n.1.
126. Id at 711 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 699.
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parted from the pattern of the Terry opinion, however, by articulating a bright line rule that, it insisted, would not require a police
officer "to evaluate either the quantum of proof justifying the deten1 28
tion or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure."
"[W]e hold," the majority said, "that a warrant to search for contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper
search is conducted."' 29 The dissenting Justices argued for a different categorical rule. They maintained that law enforcement officers
could detain a suspect pending the completion of a search only
when they had probable cause for his arrest.
Although neither the majority nor the dissenting Justices mentioned the fourth amendment's particularity requirement, that requirement might have had some bearing on the legality of the
detention in Summers. The fourth amendment declares that warrants must particularly describe "the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." In Summers, the police possessed a
warrant describing the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, but they did not possess a warrant describing even in general
terms the persons to be seized. Of course, in Summers, it might not
have been possible to describe these persons by name; but the police
certainly had reason to suppose that the house that they proposed to
search would be occupied. When the police sought a search warrant, they could have requested the authority to detain people whom
the warrant might have described as "all occupants of the premises." The propriety of the interim police detention in Summers was
sufficiently doubtful to divide the Supreme Court. For the police to
have submitted their plan of action to a magistrate would have accorded with the basic fourth amendment principle that "[wihen the
right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right to search is, as a
rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.' 130 In other situations, moreover, police officers seeking a search warrant undoubtedly could specify the
"persons to be seized" with greater particularity than the officers
could have supplied in Summers.
Had the officers in Summers sought a warrant authorizing what
they did, however, the magistrate who considered their request
128. Id at 705 n.19.
129. Id at 705.
130. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
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would have been bound to deny it. All the Justices of the Supreme
Court agreed that there was no probable cause for the detention in
Summers, and the fourth amendment expressly declares that "no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." The ruling in Summers is therefore incongruous. It gives police officers greater power
to make seizures than magistrates have to authorize them.
This anomaly illustrates the inappropriateness of the two-tiered
view of the fourth amendment articulated in Terry and Dunaway.
The language of the fourth amendment should not be construed to
preclude judicial officers from determining in advance the reasonableness of intrusions such as the detention of eight people in Summers. Nevertheless, the constitutional language plainly would
require a magistrate to make his determination of reasonableness
within a framework of probable cause. A view of the fourth amendment that treats probable cause as a unitary standard while authorizing departures from this standard when police intrusions seem
relatively minor effectively makes warrants unavailable as a means
of controlling the lesser or second-tier intrusions.131
The majority and dissenting Justices agreed that law enforcement officers required a bright line rule to determine when the occupants of a place that the officers were about to search for contraband
could be detained despite the absence of probable cause for their
arrest. Very simply, the majority's rule was always, and the dissent's
rule was never.
The dissenting Justices denied, in fact, that the fourth amendment ever had been read to authorize a departure from the probable
cause standard simply because a search or seizure involved a minor
intrusion. In their view, the Supreme Court's earlier decisions had
authorized departures from the probable cause standard only to advance "some governmental interest independent of the ordinary interest in investigating crime and apprehending suspects."' 32 To
demonstrate this point, the dissenting opinion quoted language from
Terry v. Ohio'33 in which the Supreme Court had declared that
more than the governmental interest in investigating crime [is at issue];
in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing

is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
131. See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
132. Summers, 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
133. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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134
against him.

This language appeared, however, in a portion of the Terry opinion
that considered only the propriety of a "frisk" after a police officer
had lawfully "stopped" a suspect. The dissenting Justices disregarded language that had appeared slightly earlier in the Terry
opinion:
One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection. It is this interest which underlies the recognition that a po-

lice officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
It was this legitimate investigative function that Officer McFadden was
he decided to approach petitioner and his
discharging when
35
companions.1
Moreover, if Terry had held only what the dissenting Justices in
Summers described it as holding, the ruling in that case would have
been nonsensical. The officer in Terry plainly could have protected
himself from assault simply by ignoring the suspects' reconnaissance
of a store that they apparently planned to rob and by leaving the
scene. If the officer was entitled to seize the suspects without probable cause instead, the explanation for his power obviously lay in
the governmental interest in investigating possible criminal activity.
In a concurring opinion in Terry, Justice Harlan emphasized
that "the right to frisk must be immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is . . . an articulable suspicion of a crime of violence"; 136 but, of course, police officers sometimes stop suspects to
investigate the possibility of nonviolent criminal behavior. The majority opinion in Terry declared that an officer's power to make a
patdown search in this situation depended upon his ability to articulate reasons for believing that the suspect might be armed. 137 Under
Terry, a frisk plainly is not an automatic incident of every stop. An
officer may be entitled to make a stop when the self-protective interest that would justify a frisk is entirely absent. In this situation, in
which the stop serves only the governmental interest in investigating
possible criminal behavior, the dissenting Justices in Summers apparently would require that the stop be justified by the same stan134.
135.
136.
137.

Id
Id
Id
Id

at 23 (quoted in Summers, 452 U.S. at 707 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
at 22.
at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
at 27 (majority opinion).
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dard of probable cause that they would apply to an arrest. The
Justices' misreading of Terry seemed to reflect a remarkable determination to treat unlike cases as though they were alike. In the
opinion of the dissenting Justices, the fourth amendment establishes
a unitary bright line standard for all investigative searches and
seizures, treating a thirty-second streetcorner detention in the same
manner as a decision to arrest a suspect and charge him with a
crime.
The majority, however, was not to be outdone by the dissent in
its determination to treat unlike cases alike; and it may be instructive to consider some of the many situations encompassed within the
majority's categorical rule. Police officers who search for contraband usually have some idea whose contraband they seek. In a typical situation, an informant of proven reliability may have reported
that he recently purchased heroin from Don the Dealer at Don's
residence and that Don had a large supply on hand. When the police execute a warrant to search this residence, Don may be at home;
but as soon as the officers exhibit their warrant, Don may propose to
leave (perhaps for an island off the coast of Spain). Surely, in this
situation, the officers have an adequate evidentiary basis for Don's
detention. Indeed, the officers appear to have probable cause for
Don's arrest. The informant claimed personal knowledge that drugs
were located at Don's house and, in addition, that the drugs were
owned by Don. If there was reason to believe the informant on the
first point and to issue a search warrant, there was also reason to
believe him on the second point. In this situation, probable cause to
search also seems to be probable cause to arrest.
To be sure, it might be unreasonable for the police to arrest
Don without first searching his premises; if the search were unsuccessful, the justification for Don's arrest would largely disappear.
Although a flexible standard of probable cause would permit a court
to credit the argument that the police should search first and arrest
later, that argument finds no support in the wooden definition of
probable cause that the Supreme Court has advanced and that this
article has considered. 138 Moreover, even if it would be unreasona138. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. "Probable cause" means "facts and circumstances [that] warrant a prudent man in believing that [an] offense has been committed" by a
particular individual. The Supreme Court has not been at all receptive to arguments that a search
or arrest supported by this sort of probable cause might be unreasonable because a less intrusive
procedure could have satisfied legitimate law enforcement interests. See Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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ble for the police to transport Don to the station house before
searching his residence, it plainly would be reasonable for them to
detain him until the search had been completed.
Don's detention might give rise to concern on a somewhat different ground, for it could enable the police to evade the usual requirement that they obtain an arrest warrant before making an
arrest in a private residence. 139 The arrest warrant requirement may
be inapplicable, however, when the police have entered a residence
lawfully with a search warrant. Law enforcement officers are permitted to make felony arrests in public places without warrants even
when they have had ample opportunity to obtain them. 40 The apparent reason for requiring a warrant when the police make an arrest inside a dwelling is to insure a judicial determination that the
invasion of the dwelling itself is justified. When a magistrate has
issued a search warrant authorizing invasion of a home, the reason
for treating home arrests differently from street arrests may well disappear. Nevertheless, the fourth amendment does not differentiate
between search warrants and arrest warrants; it declares that any
warrant must specify both the persons and the things to be seized.
Permitting officers to seize unspecified persons when they have a
warrant authorizing them to seize specified things seems to violate
this requirement. The need for an arrest warrant therefore seems a
doubtful issue in a case like Don's; but this issue aside, even the
dissenting Justices in Summers probably would not object to Don's
detention when a credible informant had identified him as the person in possession of contraband for which the police had been authorized to search.
A second situation encompassed by the majority's bright line
rule requires a different analysis. In this situation, the police lack
probable cause to arrest an occupant of the searched premises when
they begin their search. Nevertheless, their suspicion of this occupant would ripen into probable cause for arrest if the search were to
prove successful. This sort of case is unusual, but it was apparently
the only sort of case that the majority and dissenting opinions in
Summers considered.

It is doubtful that Summers itself truly fit the factual pattern
that the Supreme Court addressed. Under the Court's apparent
view of the circumstances of the case, the police may not have had
adequate reason to arrest the defendant even following the comple139. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
140. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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tion of their search. At the same time, facts overlooked by the Court
suggest that the police may have had probable cause to arrest the
defendant even before their search began. An examination of these
alternatives will indicate how rarely the issue addressed by the
Court is likely to arise. The discovery of contraband for which there
was probable cause to search is unlikely to supply probable cause
for the arrest of someone whom the police could not have arrested
earlier.
The majority reported that the defendant did not "challenge
the conclusion that the evidence found in his home established
probable cause to arrest him." 14 1 Nevertheless, the defendant's failure to make this argument might have established a distinct basis
for relief-that he had not received the effective assistance of counsel. In fact, both the trial court and the Michigan Court of Appeals
had concluded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the
defendant after the search had been completed. 42 The Michigan
Supreme Court had found no occasion to consider the issue because
it had held that the initial detention of the defendant was improper.' 43 The argument that the defendant declined to make was,
therefore, one that consistently had proven successful in the courts
below. Under the applicable state law, evidence that narcotics had
been found in a house that the defendant occupied with other people would have been inadequate to support his conviction for possessing these drugs, 44 and the Michigan Court of Appeals had
relied on a decision by the United States Supreme Court that
141. Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.3.
142. See People v. Summers, 68 Mich. App. 571, 243 N.W.2d 689 (1978), ajl'd 407 Mich.
432, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979), rev'd, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
143. People v. Summers, 407 Mich. 432, 286 N.W.2d 226 (1979), rev'd, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
144. People v. Davenport, 39 Mich. App. 252, 197 N.W.2d 521 (1972). The Supreme Court
majority noted:
The Michigan Court of Appeals relied on Davenport to conclude that the officers
did not have probable cause to arrest or search respondent .... Judge Bashara, dissenting in the Court of Appeals .... and the three dissenting justices of the Michigan
Supreme Court. . .pointed out that Davenport, which concerns the proof necessary to
support a conviction, is not dispositive of the question whether the police had probable
cause to arrest.
Summers, 452 U.S. at 695 n.3.
The apparent implication of the Supreme Court's statement was that, apart from Judge
Bashara, the judges of the Michigan Court of Appeals were ignorant of the difference between the
proof necessary to justify an arrest and the proof necessary to convict. Nevertheless, the judges in
the majority had recognized exactly what Judge Bashara had recognized-that a decision on the
sufficiency of the evidence to convict was not "dispositive." See 68 Mich. App. at 582, 243
N.W.2d at 693-94. Surely these judges cannot be faulted for considering it relevant to the prob-
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seemed very nearly on point when it held the defendant's arrest invalid. 145 Although the Supreme Court majority indicated that it
would have upheld the defendant's arrest even in the absence of his
implicit concession of the issue, 46 one wonders whether the discovery of the illicit drugs in Summers would have supplied probable
cause for the arrest of all eight people whom the police had detained. Surely the fact that the defendant owned the premises provided only a tenuous basis for differentiating him from the other
residents or for concluding that he, rather than147one of the others,
had owned or exercised control over the drugs.
If the defendant's ownership of a home where drugs were located was determinative, moreover, that circumstance might have
justified the defendant's arrest even prior to the police search. Although the Supreme Court indicated that the police had discovered
the defendant's ownership only after their search had been completed, police testimony at the defendant's preliminary examination
strongly suggested that he had revealed his ownership at the time of
his initial encounter with the officers. 148 The police had probable
cause to believe that illicit drugs were in the house at this time.
Their later discovery of the drugs added somewhat to the justification for arresting the defendant, but it added only a little.
More importantly-and contrary to the Supreme Court's apparent assumption-the police were not at all ignorant of whose
drugs they were likely to find at the defendant's house. The affidavit
for the search warrant in Summers recited the statement of an informant, not only that he had purchased heroin at the premises to
be searched, but also that he had purchased this heroin from a black
male named George. The informant described "George" as a perable cause determination that the evidence possessed by the police would have been legally insufficient to support a conviction.
145. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
146. 452 U.S. at 695 n.3.
147. The defendant in Summers was never charged with possessing the drugs that the police
found in his basement. He was charged with possessing drugs that the police found on his person
during a search incident to his arrest. See 452 U.S. at 693-94.
148. See Joint Appendix at 16, Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981):
The Court: [How did the defendant] get inside of the house?
The Witness: He accompanied us inside.
The Court: What do you mean he accompanied you inside?
The Witness: He said it was his house, your Honor.
The Court: Oh. Did you tell him to come in?
The Witness: I told him to come in.
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son of medium build and complexion; with short hair; five feet, ten
49
inches tall; and approximately thirty-one to thirty-three years old.1
The first name of the defendant in Summers was George. The record does not reveal the extent to which he matched the informant's
description. Although the testimony of police officers often described the person whom they detained as "George," the record
does not reveal with clarity when they first learned his identity. The
inadequacy of the record in Summers might have kept a court from
finding that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant as
soon as they encountered him. On its historic facts, however, Summers may well have been a case like that of Don the Dealer. There
was probably an adequate evidentiary basis for the defendant's arrest even before the search began.
The Supreme Court treated Summers as the type of case in
which only the discovery of drugs following a search had supplied
probable cause for the defendant's arrest. Although this sort of case
would plainly be rare, it could, of course, arise. The Court offered
several reasons for permitting a detention of the suspect in this situation, and all except one of them seemed trivial. The Court
observed:
A neutral and detached magistrate had found probable cause to believe
that the law was being violated in that house and had authorized a

substantial invasion of the privacy of the persons who resided there.
The detention of one of the residents while the premises were being

searched, although admittedly a significant restraint on his liberty, was
surely less intrusive than the search itself.150

The relevance of this comment is difficult to discern. Perhaps the
Court's theory was that once the legitimate needs of law enforcement have justified hitting a person hard, it is a matter of little con5
sequence that he has been hit again.' '
The majority in Summers also suggested that detention would
"minimiz[e] the risk of harm to the officers"' 52 and that "the orderly
completion of the search may be facilitated if the occupants of the
premises are present. Their self-interest may induce them to open
locked doors or locked containers to avoid the use of force that is
149. Id at 61.
150. 452 U.S. at 701.
151. But cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766-67 n.12 (1969) ("[W]e can see no reason
why, simply because some interference with an individual's privacy and freedom of movement has
lawfully taken place, further intrusions should automatically be allowed.
152. 452 U.S. at 702.
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not only damaging to property but may also delay the completion of
the task at hand."' 153 Nevertheless, it is difficult to understand how
permitting someone to leave the premises would risk harm to the
officers; perhaps the fear is that this person would return with an
army. Moreover, if the occupants of the searched premises wished
to facilitate the search by opening doors and containers voluntarily,
it would not be necessary to detain them.
The majority advanced a much more substantial argument
when it noted "the legitimate law enforcement interest in preventing
flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found."' 154 In cases
in which the police have probable cause to search but in which their
suspicion of a particular occupant would ripen into probable cause
for arrest only in the event that the search proved successful, detention of the occupant until the search is completed does seem reasonable. In this situation, the majority's bright line rule yields an
appropriate result.
The rule that "a warrant to search for contraband . . . carries
with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises
while a proper search is conducted," however, extends well beyond
this atypical situation. The majority said that "[ilt is. . . appropriate to consider the nature of the articulable and individualized suspicion on which the police base the detention of the occupant of a
home subject to a search warrant," 155 but the majority's rule reaches
many situations in which there is no articulable or individualized
basis of suspicion whatever-situations in which even successful
completion of the search will not supply probable cause for arresting people whom the police have detained.
Exactly how far beyond its basis in reason the majority's rule
extends seems somewhat uncertain, for the word "occupant" may
not be a word of bright line precision. The usual usage of this word
is probably clear. Everyone who attends a concert is an occupant of
the concert hall, and if the majority intended the word "occupant"
to be understood in its usual sense, its bright line rule would authorize police officers to detain 500 people at an Elks Club dance while
the officers executed a warrant to search the ballroom for contraband. Surely the detention of all of these people would not be supported by "articulable and individualized suspicion," and surely the
153. Id at 703.
154. Id at 702.
155. Id at 703.
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discovery of contraband in the ballroom would not supply probable
cause for the arrest of all 500.156
In a footnote the majority referred to the "routine detention of
residents of a house,"' 57 and perhaps the majority used the word
"occupant" only as a synonym for "resident." Although this usage
might seem unusual, it would not be unprecedented. A nonresident
who notices an envelope on a hal table addressed simply to "occupant" usually does not feel entitled to open it. A narrow construction of the word "occupant," however, sometimes would require
police officers to engage in case-by-case adjudication before applying the Supreme Court's bright line rule. Although a police officer
would not need probable cause to consider a person a criminal
before detaining him, he apparently would need probable cause to
consider this person a resident. Upon encountering a large group of
people in a living room, a police officer therefore might inquire,
"Sir, do you live here, or are you a guest? Do you have a driver's
license that shows your home address? Very well, you may leave.
And you, madam? Over there against the wall please."' 158
Even a narrow construction of the majority's flickering bright
line rule would leave the rule much broader than its asserted justification. As this article has noted, police officers who search for contraband usually know whose contraband they seek. The detention
of someone suspected of owning this contraband presents one sort of
issue; the detention of other people presents another. A credible informant may have reported, for example, that Junior keeps drugs at
his home. When the police arrive with a warrant to search for these
drugs, they may find Junior at home and Mom and Pop as well.
When Pop attempts to leave, the police may detain him. 59 Under
any view of the Supreme Court's rule, this detention seems authorized. The Supreme Court proclaimed that suspicion of criminal activity justified the detention in Summers, but it articulated a rule
that reaches situations in which there is no basis for suspecting criminal activity on the part of the people detained. The ruling in Summers therefore extends Terry, not only by authorizing detentions
156. See LaFave, supra note 18, at 328 n. 116.
157. 452 U.S. at 705 n.21.
158. Although Summers holds that police officers may detain the occupants of places that
they are about to search, the Supreme Court has held that the police may not automatically frisk
these people for purposes of self-protection. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
159. Pop's desire to leave may not be as callous as it seems. He may simply wish to go to the
neighborhood tavern to see if he can persuade Paul Newman to represent Junior.
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substantially more intrusive than the detentions permitted by that
case, but also by eliminating Terry's requirement that investigative
detentions governed by the fourth amendment be based on reasonable suspicion.
When a legislature enacts a generalized rule, the reason is usually that some interest group has perceived a generalized problem
meriting a generalized solution. Before enacting the rule, the legislature is likely to have investigated the extent of the problem as well
as the merits of the solution that the interest group has proposed. In
Michigan v. Summers, however, the Supreme Court considered an
unusual situation (one that may not have been presented even by
the circumstances of the case before the Court); imagined that this
situation presented a common, recurring problem; and then articulated a rule that extended beyond the situation that the Court appeared to address.
Perhaps the Supreme Court failed to recognize the breadth of
the rule that it announced. Perhaps it simply did not consider Mom
and Pop and all those folks at the Elks Club dance. Or perhaps the
Court thought that police officers lack the ability that ordinary peo*ple possess to differentiate gratuitous detentions from those that
serve a purpose. The Court truly might have concluded that police
officers require a rule treating all "detentions incident to searches"
as a class. The first hypothesis-that the Court failed to anticipate
the variety of situations encompassed by its rule-suggests one danger ofjudicial efforts to develop bright line rules, while the secondthat the Court doubted the ability of police officers to observe the
general standards of decency that the rest of us are expected to observe-advances an even more troublesome view of judicial efforts
to reduce the fourth amendment to bright line formulas.
VI.

SEARCHES INCIDENT TO DETENTIONS AGAIN: NEW YORK V
BELTON

Although Professor LaFave has voiced approval of the decisions in Dunaway, Robinson and Summers,1 60 one bright line ruling
of the Supreme Court has provoked his criticism. 61 In New York v.
Belton,162 a state trooper stopped a car for speeding, discovered evidence of marijuana use, ordered the four people inside the car to
160. See LaFave, supra note 18, at 323-24 (Dunaway), 323 (Robinson), 328 (Summers).
161. See id at 324-33.
162. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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step out of it and arrested them. After frisking the suspects, the officer "split them up into four separate areas of the Thruway. . . so
they would not be in physical touching area of each other."' 163 The
officer then searched each of the suspects more thoroughly, returned
to the automobile, searched its passenger compartment, opened a
zippered pocket in a black leather jacket that he found on the automobile's rear seat and discovered some cocaine. It was undisputed
that the officer's arrest of the four suspects was lawful, and the
Supreme Court upheld the officer's search of the automobile and the
jacket pocket as an incident of the arrest.
Of course, Chimel v. Calfornia164 had stated that "[t]he scope of
[a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances
which render. . . its initiation permissible"' 65 and had concluded
that a search incident to an arrest could not extend beyond "the area
from within which [an arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon
or destructible evidence." 66 The Supreme Court did not contend in
Belton that the jacket on the rear seat was within grabbing distance
of any of the four suspects on the highway.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed at length both the division of
lower courts on the appropriate scope of searches incident to arrest
when suspects have been arrested in or near automobiles and the
need of front-line officers for bright-line standards. The Court
concluded:
Our reading of the cases suggests the generalization that articles inside
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within "the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m].". . . In order to establish the workable rule this category of cases requires, we read Chimel's definition of the limits of the
area that may be searched in light of that generalization. Accordingly,
we hold that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of
the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident
67
of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.'
The Court added that the search incident to arrest could include the
opening of closed glove compartments; 68 of "luggage, boxes, bags,
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id at 456.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).
Id at 763.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
Id at 461 n.4.
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[and] clothing" within the automobile; 69 and even of small containers that "could hold neither a weapon nor evidence of the criminal
conduct for which the suspect was arrested."' 170 In a footnote, however, the Court declared: "Our holding encompasses only the interior of the passenger compartment.
trunk."171

. .

and does not encompass the

If any bright line rule had been necessary to resolve the issue in
Belton, it would have been the opposite of the rule that the Court
announced. Indeed, the claim that "articles inside the relatively
narrow compass of the passenger compartment.

. .

are.

. .

gener-

ally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]'" was
almost as farfetched as the proposition that evidence might have
been destroyed or a weapon secured on the facts of Belton itself. It
is difficult to search an automobile while its occupants remain inside. An officer who attempts this task constantly must ask the occupants to slide over and move their feet. Accordingly, the occupants
almost invariably are removed before an automobile is searched;
and once they have been removed, there is no longer much chance
that they can secure weapons from the automobile or destroy evidence there.
Although the principle of Chimel v. California does not seem
difficult to apply to cases like Belton, the Supreme Court maintained
that lower "courts ha[d] found no workable definition of 'the area
within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant."' 72 Indeed, the Court noted that the applicability of
the doctrine of search incident to arrest had produced a division of
opinion among the judges who had considered Belton itself. One
possible reason for this division of opinion might be that some
judges cheat, but a more charitable explanation would concede
Chimel's ambiguity on one issue. When Chimel spoke of the area
within an arrestee's immediate control, did it include the area that
had been within his control at the time of arrest although the arrestee was no longer near that area, or did Chimel refer only to the area
that remained within an arrestee's control at the time of the
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id
Id at 461.
Id at 461 n.4.
Id at 460.
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search? 173

The Supreme Court could have resolved this ambiguity simply
by noting that the doctrine of search incident to arrest is designed to
guard against real dangers; its function is not to give police officers a
bonus for a job well done. The "grabbing area" to which Chimel
referred was accordingly the "actual grabbing area" of an arrestee,
not some "hypothetical grabbing area" measured by reference to a
time other than the time at which a search occurs. With this minor
clarification, the Chimel doctrine would have seemed as easy to apply as the supposedly bright line rule that the Court developed in
Belton.
The ruling in Belton was so obviously artificial that one may
wonder whether its announcement was part of a hidden agenda or
responsive to concerns other than those which the Supreme Court
expressed. In fact, the Court's hidden agenda was hardly hidden at
all. In its judging of categories rather than cases, the Supreme Court
has treated automobiles as a class apart from houses, boxes and
other things that may conceal incriminating evidence. This categorization has led to significant incongruities and embarrassments,
and the Supreme Court apparently concluded in Belton that the
doctrine of search incident to arrest offered an escape route. Nevertheless, the escape route chosen by the Court led only to a deeper
portion of the dungeon.
Except in an emergency situation in which a law enforcement
officer lacks a realistic opportunity to obtain a judicial warrant, the
fourth amendment usually requires the issuance of a warrant as a
prerequisite to a search. 74 The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that the requirement of a warrant is subject to an "automobile
exception."' 75 This exception apparently does not apply when a police officer could have obtained a warrant well in advance of his
seizure of an automobile. 76 Nevertheless, when an officer properly
may seize an automobile without a warrant and when he has probable cause to search the automobile's interior, he may make this
search without a warrant. The automobile exception applies even
173. See People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 508, 300 N.E.2d 139, 143 (1973) ("it is not at
all clear that the 'grabbing distance' authorized in the Chimel case is conditioned upon the arrested person's continued capacity 'to grab.' ").
174. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1967).
175. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
176. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1921); but see Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583 (1974).
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when the officer's search occurs long after the automobile's impoundment at a time when he easily could seek the approval of a
magistrate.
The automobile exception usually is traced to the Supreme
Court's 1925 decision in Carrollv. United States.177 In Carroll,however, the occupants of an automobile that had been stopped on a
highway apparently were not under arrest and could not have been
arrested lawfully. 178 Had law enforcement officers left the suspects
and the vehicle while seeking a warrant, it is unlikely that the officers would have been able to find the vehicle and execute the warrant upon their return. The warrantless search in Carrolltherefore
involved no departure from customary fourth amendment principles, and the Supreme Court emphasized this fact. Chief Justice
Taft's opinion for the Court declared, "In cases where the securing
of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used." 179 In the
Court's view, the distinction between structures and automobiles
was simply that it might not be "practicable to secure a warrant [for
an automobile search] because the vehicle [could] be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought."180

In 1970, however, in Chambers v. Mfaroney,18 1 the Supreme
Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile after its occupants had been arrested and the automobile taken to the police station. In the course of an elaborate opinion, the Court insisted that
177. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
178. The Supreme Court concluded that federal officers had probable cause to search the
vehicle that they had stopped, and there may have been probable cause to arrest the occupants of
the vehicle as well. Nevertheless, the occupants could have been arrested only for a misdemeanor,
and their arrest without a warrant would have been lawful only if the misdemeanor had occurred
in the officers' presence. The defendants maintained, "The true rule is that unless the offense is
discoverable without a search, it is not, in legal contemplation, committed in the presence of the
officer." Id at 137 (argument for the plaintiffs in error). The Supreme Court apparently accepted
this argument and ruled that the search of the vehicle could not be justified as the incident of a
lawful arrest because any arrest of the defendants would have been unlawful. It said:
The argument of defendants is based on the theory that the seizure in this case can only
be thus justified. If their theory were sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of
the seizure then would turn wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the
theory is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent
on the right to arrest.
Id at 158.
179. Id at 156.
180. Id at 153.
181. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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the "mobility of the car . . . still obtained at the stationhouse."' 82
Seven years later, however, the Supreme Court confessed,
Our treatment of automobiles has been based in part on their inherent

mobility, which often makes obtaining a judicial warrant impracticable. Nevertheless, we have also sustained "warrantless searches of vehicles . . . in cases in which the possibilities of the vehicle's being
removed 83
or evidence in it destroyed were remote, if not non-

existent."

Once the Supreme Court had bent the warrant requirement in
automobile cases, government lawyers tested the Court's willingness
to bend the requirement in other cases. The Department of Justice
urged the Court to hold the warrant requirement applicable only to
governmental invasions of conversational privacy and to the search
of homes and offices. If the Court was unwilling to endorse that
position, the government urged that the Court at least hold the warrant requirement inapplicable to the search of personal luggage.
Luggage, although not self-propelled, is mobile. The Supreme
Court rejected both suggestions in UnitedStates v. Chadwick. 184 After Chadwick, the warrant requirement apparently applied to the
search of big boxes called houses and small boxes called suitcases,
but it ordinarily did not extend to the search of middle-sized boxes
called automobiles. 8 5
Not surprisingly, the Court soon was asked to consider the
search of a suitcase that had been found inside an automobile. The
Court held in Arkansas v. Sanders 8 6 that a container did not lose
the protection of the warrant clause simply by being placed inside
an automobile. After Sanders, although law enforcement officers
could search a glove compartment without a warrant, they needed a
warrant to search a box on the automobile's front seat. Although
officers could search an automobile trunk without a warrant, they
could not open a trunk within the trunk except upon a magistrate's
approval.
182. Id at 52.
183. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413
U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973)).
184. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
185. For further analysis of both Chadwick and the "sophisticated four-tier analysis" that
sometimes makes "the size of the box that the police propose to open" the primary determinant of
whether a search warrant is necessary, see Alschuler, Burger's Failure: Trying Too Much to Lead,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 18, 1980, 19 at 26, cols. 3 & 4.
186. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
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The artificiality of the Sanders rule led to artificial proposals
for its limitation. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the Court might require search warrants in cases like
Sanders, in which law enforcement officers lacked probable cause to
search an entire automobile but had probable cause to search a particular container within the vehicle. When police officers had probable cause to search an entire automobile, however, the Chief
Justice suggested that they should be allowed to open containers inside the vehicle without a warrant by virtue of the automobile
exception.187
Moreover, a footnote to the majority opinion in Sanders declared: "Not all containers and packages found by the police during
the course of a search will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, some containers. . . by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy .... -188 This
statement led some lower courts to distinguish "worthy containers,"
whose search ordinarily would require advance judicial approval,
from "unworthy containers," which police officers could search
without warrants'and without probable cause. 189 Indeed, inRobbins
v. California,190 a case decided the same day as Belton, one Supreme
Court Justice proposed a tripartite classification of containers. Justice Powell suggested a bright line rule requiring advance judicial
approval for the search of containers like personal luggage that, he
said, are "inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy." He
proposed a different bright line rule dispensing with judicial warrants for the search of containers like plastic cups and grocery
sacks-containers that, he said, "consistently lack such an association." Finally, Justice Powell proposed a regime of case-by-case adjudication for what he labeled "ambiguous containers"--containers
such as cardboard boxes and laundry bags.' 91
Although the Supreme Court seemed to bend the warrant requirement only a little to create the automobile exception, that piece
of artificial categorization led to a monstrosity of incoherent law. In
Belton, the Court responded to the difficulties that its earlier deci187. Id at 766, 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
188. Id at 764-65 n.13 (majority opinion).
189. E.g., United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Goshorn,
628 F.2d 697 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980); State v.
DeLong, 43 Or. App. 183, 602 P.2d 665 (1979).
190. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
191. Id at 434 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
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sions had created by adding another layer of incoherency. The factual situation in Robbins v. California, the case that the Court
decided with Belton, was almost identical to the situation in Belton
itself. Nevertheless, the lawyer who argued Robbins for the state of
California failed to argue that the search of containers within a vehicle had been justified as an incident of the driver's arrest. 92 The
Supreme Court apparently seized on this failure193 and considered
only the applicability of the automobile exception in Robbins. In
essence, the Court abandoned the hint that it might develop a "worthy container" rule and reaffirmed Sanders, holding that the police
could not open two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic that
they had found inside an automobile without first obtaining a
warrant.
Although Robbins preserved the facade of the Supreme Court's
prior decisions on the scope of the automobile exception, Belton undid their substance. In some situations, police officers who stop an
automobile may have probable cause to search the vehicle but no
justification for arresting any of its occupants. In these rare situations, exigent circumstances of the sort presented in Carroll are
likely to justify a warrantless search of the automobile and containers within it. More commonly, police officers who stop an automobile do have probable cause to arrest one or more of its occupants.
In these situations, Belton permits the officers to search all containers within the passenger compartment of the automobile incident to
the arrest. Under Belton, it is unnecessary to determine whether the
police have probable cause to search an entire automobile or merely
a container within it; a search incident to an arrest does not require
probable cause of either type. Similarly, it is unnecessary to distinguish worthy from unworthy containers; the police may search them
all.
The Supreme Court's apparent resolution of the automobile
search imbroglio in Robbins and Belton lasted less than a year. In
192. In a telephone interview on November 3, 1981, this lawyer, Ronald E. Niver, a Deputy
Attorney General of California, explained that prosecutors in the courts below had not attempted
to justify the search as an incident of the driver's arrest because the law on this point seemed
clearly settled in the defendant's favor. Belton and Robbins may suggest that lawyers in cases
likely to reach the Supreme Court should not take too seriously the ethical admonition against
advancing apparently unsupportable arguments. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILiTY DR 7-102(A)(2).
193. See Robbins, 453 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring).
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1982, in United States v. Ross,194 the Court overruled Robbins and
adopted the position that Chief Justice Burger had proposed in
Sanders. When law enforcement officers have probable cause to
search an entire automobile, they may open and search containers
within the automobile by virtue of the automobile exception. They
need not obtain a warrant for this search.1 95
Although Ross overruled Robbins, it left Belton intact; and Belton goes well beyond Ross in one respect. The automobile exception applied in Ross is an exception only to the requirement that law
194. 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
195. One commentator claimed that 'Ross has indeed established a 'bright line' . .. ."
Note, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1, 185 (1982). Nevertheless, the application of Ross can prove as mind-boggling in some situations as the application of other automobile
search rulings. In the course of its opinion, the Supreme Court articulated three circumstances
that it thought differentiated Ross from situations in which search warrants should be required.
First, "suspicion was not directed at a specific container." 456 U.S. at 814. Second, "police officers had probable cause to search respondent's entire vehicle." Id at 817. Third, probable cause
to search the container did not exist before the container was placed inside the automobile. Id at
814.
The difficulty is that all of these circumstances may not be present at the same time. For
example, an informant of proven reliability might have reported that two people who are currently driving from Florida to Illinois are carrying stolen diamonds in a small silk purse located
somewhere within their vehicle. In this situation, suspicion plainly would be directed to a specific
container, but there also would be probable cause to search the entire vehicle (for the container).
Moreover, in this case, probable cause for searching the container would not have arisen until
after the container had been placed in the vehicle; perhaps the case would be different if the
informant had described the container and its contents before the couple began their journey. In
an even more confusing case, an informant might report that stolen diamonds could be found in
one of three containers within a car-a silk purse, a sow's ear, or a baby bottle. (Of course, a
police officer who heard any of these accounts might be tempted to minimize litigation by advising
his informant to tell him only that the diamonds could be found somewhere within the car.)
Resolution of the uncertainties of Ross is difficult because Ross, like its predecessors, creates
an unprincipled rule. Suppose, for example, that David Dupe, an honest and credulous youth, has
been hired to carry plans for a shopping center from Texas to New York in an automobile owned
by the Great Gonzo Merchandising Company. In fact, the locked green briefcase that he is to
carry has been filled by a company officer, Gonzo, with illicit drugs, and the automobile that he is
to drive has been loaded with drugs as well. A reliable informant within the company has told the
police of the plan to deceive David and deliver the drugs, and as David approaches the car with
the briefcase, the police approach him. The police realize that they do not have probable cause to
arrest David; his actus reus is accompanied by an innocent mind. Although the doctrine of search
incident to arrest is therefore inapplicable, the police have probable cause to search both the
briefcase and the vehicle. They conduct these searches without first securing a warrant. Inside the
vehicle, the police discover a locked green briefcase like the one that David had in his hand. They
search this second briefcase without a warrant as well. Under Ross, the search of the green briefcase found within the automobile is legal; the search of the briefcase that David was carrying,
illegal. A rule that treats these two searches differently cannot offer principled guidance to an
officer confronted with an ambiguous case; resolution of the "borderline issues" posed by Ross
ultimately must depend on guesswork.
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enforcement officers obtain a warrant before making a search; even
when this exception applies, the search of an automobile and containers within it must be supported by probable cause. Belton, however, permits a law enforcement officer to invoke the doctrine of
search incident to arrest to justify the search of an automobile, luggage and other containers and to make this search in the absence of
probable cause.
The Supreme Court's expansion of the doctrine of search incident to arrest in United States v. Robinson 96 pales beside the
Court's later extension of this doctrine in Belton. Indeed, Robinson,
which permitted a police officer to search the person of a motorist
whom he had arrested for a licensing violation, suddenly seems a
cautious and conservative ruling. After Belton, an officer who
makes a lawful custodial arrest for a traffic offense not only may
remove and search any purse, wallet or crumpled cigarette package
that the arrestee is carrying; he also may search the arrestee's car
and luggage or other containers within it. The officer may make this
search simply to satisfy his curiosity, to pursue vague suspicions, or
even to harass. Belton gives anyone who drives an automobile and
cares about his privacy a new and powerful incentive to obey the
rules of the road.
In Belton, the Supreme Court purchased what proved to be a
transient solution to the difficulties that its automobile search rulings had created, and the Court paid a heavy price. Seeking a facesaving escape from the embarrassing box that its earlier rulings had
constructed, the Court to some extent abandoned the security that
the fourth amendment was designed to preserve. Moreover, although Belton's sacrifice of privacy may have been an inordinate
price in itself, the Court paid a second price as well. Rather than
clarify the law of search and seizure, the Supreme Court's supposedly bright line rule cast the doctrine of search incident to arrest into
a state of disarray.
Like the dissenting Justices in Belton, Professor LaFave has
noted that Belton's bright line rule has fuzzy edges. 197 For example,
although the Supreme Court said that an automobile search would
fall within its bright line rule only if the search were a "contemporaneous incident" of the arrest, the Court offered no basis for determining whether a search conducted thirty minutes or an hour after
196. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
197. See LaFave, supra note 18, at 327-28 n. 114.
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an arrest would remain a "contemporaneous incident." This sort of
uncertainty may be more troublesome than the uncertainty inherent
in a system of case-by-case adjudication, for, as Professor James B.
White has noted, "[i]f [a] grant of authority is not based upon reasons, it cannot be limited by them either. The impact is one not of
clarification but incoherence, for clarity is a function of intelligibility."19 8 To determine the boundaries of the Belton rule, law enforcement officers and courts must guess. Limitations of the rule
can be only limitations by fiat.
The uncertain boundary of the Supreme Court's bright line rule
is a relatively minor part of the uncertainty that Belton has created.
More significant than the "boundary issues" that Professor LaFave
has discussed are issues that might be termed "spillover issues."
How will Belton affect cases in which the Court's bright line rule is
not directly applicable? What effect will the decision have on the
doctrine of search incident to arrest generally? What additional
bright line rules may the Supreme Court ultimately articulate for
the search of filing cabinets in offices, lunch boxes in factories, tool
chests at construction sites, duffel bags in Winnebagoes, and jackets
that arrestees have left on living room sofas?
Consider, for example, a case in which a police officer has
made a lawful custodial arrest for hitchhiking. After the arrest, the
officer has ordered the arrestee to stand beside a police vehicle with
his feet apart and his hands against the vehicle. The officer then has
opened a small backpack that had been at the arrestee's feet at the
time of his arrest but which was about twenty-five feet away from
the arrestee at the time of the search. In this backpack, the officer
has discovered some marijuana.
A prosecutor might note in this case that the arrestee was probably as close to his backpack as the arrestee in Belton had been to
his jacket. Moreover, the fact that the backpack was not inside an
automobile made the possibility that the arrestee might gain access
to this luggage somewhat greater than the possibility that the arrestee in Belton might have gained access to his jacket. The prosecutor
might argue that the hitchhiker's failure to enclose his backpack
within an automobile should not immunize it from the search without a warrant and without probable cause that would have been
appropriate had the backpack been located inside a car; if anything,
198. White, supra note 116, at 203.
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the absence of a larger container around the smaller container
should have the opposite effect.
The defense attorney might respond that Belton had addressed
only the special problems presented by automobile searches and was
therefore inapplicable to hitchhiking cases. Moreover, because the
Supreme Court did not base its resolution of Belton on the equities
of that case, it is immaterial that the equities of this hitchhiking case
might be similar. Bright line decisions cannot be treated as ordinary
judicial precedents, the defense attorney might argue; instead they
must be treated in the same manner as statutes.
The prosecutor then might agree to speak of categories rather
than cases. He might suggest that just as law enforcement officers
require a bright line rule concerning the scope of searches incident
to arrest in automobile cases, they require a bright line rule concerning the scope of searches incident to arrest when they have found
luggage and other containers in the possession of an arrestee or near
his person at the time of his detention. The prosecutor might argue
that these containers are "generally, even if not inevitably, within
'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a
weapon or evidentiary ite[m].'" Moreover, the prosecutor might
note that courts and law enforcement officers have found the search
of luggage and other containers following an arrest even more problematic than they have found the search of automobiles. 199 Accordingly, the need for a bright line rule in cases like this one is clearer
than the need for a bright line rule had been in Belton.
At a minimum, the prosecutor might add, Belton resolved the
possible ambiguity of Chimel by endorsing a "hypothetical grabbing
area" concept. The Supreme Court plainly viewed the legitimacy of
the search in Belton from the vantage point of the moment of arrest
rather than the moment at which the search occurred. Even if
courts reject the invitation to develop additional bright line rules
and insist on case-by-case adjudication, the Supreme Court's apparent endorsement of this "hypothetical grabbing area" concept has
significant implications. Just as the Court permitted an officer to
search a jacket in an automobile that had been near an arrestee at
the time of his arrest despite the fact that the arrestee had been removed from the area, an officer should be allowed to search a jacket
in a room that an arrestee no longer occupies so long as the jacket
199. See 2 W.

LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE

§ 5.5(a) (1978 & 1983 Pocket Part).
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had been within the arrestee's "grabbing area" at the time of arrest.
Similarly, an officer should be allowed to search a backpack that
was at a hitchhiker's feet at the time he was detained.
At this point, the defense attorney might insist that, although
the Supreme Court did not say so, Belton was a response to the difficulties that the Court had encountered in determining the scope of
the automobile search exception. If Belton endorsed a "hypothetical
grabbing area" concept (a point that the defense attorney certainly
would not concede), it did so only to save the Court from further
difficulties in automobile search cases.
The prosecutor might respond that the defense attorney's effort
to psychoanalyze the Supreme Court was unbecoming and irrelevant. In his best country drawl, the prosecutor might remark that
the defense attorney, by arguing repeatedly that Be/ton was only for
automobiles, reminded him of the Vermont justice of the peace
who, having to pass upon a charge of stealing a black horse, announced that in his law book he could find references only to bay
200
horses and roans and that the defendant must be discharged.
Legislatures sometimes may enact rules only for bay horses or only
for automobiles, but ruling by fiat is inapproriate in a system of adjudication. If a court cannot articulate a reason for treating
hitchhikers and motorists differently (a better reason than that the
Supreme Court once got itself into an awfully bad box in automobile cases), the court must apply the same rule to both. Whatever
the motives that prompted the decision in Belton, the Supreme
Court and other courts must accept the Belton ruling at face value
and apply its principles consistently.
After this mini-lecture on the nature of the judicial process in
hitchhiking cases, both attorneys might leave the issue to the judge.
Sometimes it is nice not to be a judge. Does Be/ton provide a rule
only for automobile searches? Can the implications of this decision
for the search of containers other than automobiles simply be ignored in any adjudicative system that has not abandoned its commitment to principle?
If, for a moment, the bright line rule of Belton yielded a reasonably clear resolution of the automobile search imbroglio, it simultaneously divorced the doctrine of search incident to arrest from its
moorings. Belton converted this doctrine from a rule with a reason
200. See Sutherland, Prologueto an Introduction, in
(1962).

THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW AssocIA-

TION, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW vii, ix
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to a gratuity for a job well done. Moreover, the size of this gratuity
is now anyone's guess. At best, Belton offered a lesson in hydraulics
by pushing uncertainty from one legal problem to another. Perhaps
the case teaches some other lessons as well: nonsense is likely to
yield nonsense, and nonsense rules are likely to prove difficult to
apply.
At the same time that the Supreme Court decided Belton, Justice Rehnquist observed in a dissenting opinion in Robbins:
I think that probably any search for "bright lines" short of overruling

Mapp v. Ohio2 ' is apt to be illusory. Our entire profession is trained

to attack "bright lines" the way hounds attack foxes. Acceptance by the

courts of arguments that one thing is the "functional equivalent" of the
other, for example, soon breaks down what
202 might have been a bright
line into a blurry impressionistic pattern.
The implication of this statement is that bright line rules might
prove workable if only lawyers would cease their hound-like howling. Nevertheless, it is not simply our profession's indoctrination in
sophistry that accounts for its dogged behavior. One thing may be
the equivalent of another, not just in the minds of some lawyers, but
in fact. It is sometimes a lawyer's duty to argue the equivalence of
equivalent things and a judge's duty to treat equivalent things alike.
If this process generally leads to the breakdown of bright line rules,
the reason may be that the process exposes defects too serious to
ignore in the rules that collapse.
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE INCREDIBLE HULK ATTENDS THE
POLICE ACADEMY

It is possible to view bright line fourth amendment rules simply
as political gimmicks. Both activist hawks and activist doves, when
they have the upper hand, may be tempted to play for higher stakes
than the appropriate resolution of a case. If the Supreme Court's
assertion of the need for bright line rules is taken at face value, however, the Court seems to regard law enforcement officers as incapable of case-by-case judgment. Perhaps, after this lengthy attempt at
responsible scholarship, you are ready for an attempt at irresponsible whimsy. I therefore present to you the highest ranking graduate
of the police academy class of 1990. He is green and muscular; his
name is Officer Gazenga; and these are his words:
201. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
202. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Gazenga is a good officer. He has memorized all 437 Supreme Court
bright line rules for search and seizure. For example, Gazenga has
made a lawful arrest in a car. Gazenga rip that car apart! But Gazenga
never touch trunk of car unless there is probable cause, for Gazenga
has read footnote 4 of Belton opinion.
Now Gazenga has made a lawful arrest in a house. Different bright
line rule apply to a house. Gazenga may search glove compartment of
car when suspect far away, but may not search desk drawer in living
20 3
room unless suspect right there. Why? Supreme Court say so.
Gazenga just a cop.
Gazenga now has made lawful arrest in cabin cruiser. Oh no!
Supreme Court forgot to give Gazenga bright line rule for cabin
cruiser! What is poor Gazenga to do?

Of course, this picture of Officer Gazenga's lessons at the police
academy is overdrawn, and so is the following depiction of another
lesson that might be taught at the police academy of 1990-a lesson
that would teach most of what an officer would need to know about
the fourth amendment in about sixty seconds:
Ladies and gentlemen, the fourth amendment forbids unreasonable
searches and seizures. It requires you to have a strong and persuasive
reason before you make a search, seizure or arrest. I emphasize that
your reason for invading someone's privacy must be a reason that another person is likely to find persuasive, for very frequently you will not
be the final judge of your actions. A court that passes on these actions
ought to recognize the difficulty of the situation that confronted you,
but it cannot credit whims, hunches or insubstantial reasons. What is
more, you are expected to take your reasons to a judge before making a
search or seizure whenever you can. You must do this by filing a sworn
written statement that describes the relevant facts in detail and by asking the judge to issue a search or arrest warrant. Of course there may
be situations in which you believe that you have a persuasive reason for
a search or seizure and a judge disagrees. Basically, however, if you act
in a decent manner, respect the other person's privacy and seek a warrant whenever you can, your actions will not violate the fourth
amendment.

Professor LaFave titled his 1982 Mellon Lectures "The Fourth
Amendment in an Imperfect World"; 2°4 and even in a more perfect
world, a one-minute lecture on the fourth amendment might be in203. In Belton, 453 U.S. at 458, the Supreme Court quoted a declaration of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,763 (1969): The doctrine of search incident to arrest cannot justify "routinely
searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs--or, for that matter, for searching
through all the desk drawers of other closed or concealed areas in that room itself."
204. LaFave, supra note 18.
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sufficient. This article has recognized that the development of presumptive rules for the resolution of recurring fourth amendment
issues is desirable, and presumptive rules concerning such issues as
the credibility of anonymous tipsters, of citizen informants and of
first-time police informants certainly should be part of the police
academy course. Similarly, police cadets should learn of doctrines
like that concerning searches incident to arrest (although the principled Chimel version of the "search incident" doctrine undoubtedly
would be easier to master than the supposedly bright line version of
Belton).
This article also has argued that a system of case-by-case adjudication can communicate important principles; and police academy
instructors might attempt to convey the law of search and seizure in
the same way that Bracton, 20 5 Hale, 20 6 and Hawkins 20 7 did-by
describing a series of individual cases and their resolution. All in
all, it might be worthwhile to devote an hour or even more of the
police academy course to the fourth amendment.
Although the curriculum that I have proposed might be appropriate in 1990, it plainly would be inadequate to convey the current
law of search and seizure. Any police academy superintendent who
followed these suggestions today would deserve to be fired if not
prosecuted. Indeed, the claim that law enforcement officers cannot
comprehend the current law of search and seizure after much more
extensive training than I have proposed is probably well-founded.
What renders substantive fourth amendment law incomprehensible, however, is not the lack of categorical rules but too many of
them. The application of different principles to seizures of persons
than to seizures of things, the development of differing rules for arrests in restaurants than for arrests in houses, the attempt to articulate two tiers of justification for a thousand kinds of seizures, the
proliferation of distinctions between and among containers-all of
these and more have rendered the fourth amendment a Ptolemaic
system. Only a police officer who studies Professor LaFave's threevolume treatise on evenings and weekends can master the epicycles.
As Dean Leon Green once said of another body of law, "The answer lies in a revolt from the supremacy of rules. 20 8 The phrase
205. 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 86, at 356-58.
206. 1 M. HALE, supra note 87, at 587-88; 2 id at 80-81.
207. 2 W. HAWKINS, supra note 89, at 118.
208.

L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 222 (1930).
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"unreasonable searches and seizures" can rarely be reduced much
further. Abandoning the judging of categories, courts should resume the judging of cases. In that way, they might make the law of
search and seizure substantially more comprehensible to the police
and to the rest of us.
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